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THE DETERMINATION OF INSANITY

IN CRIMINAL CASES*
SAM PARKER
INTRODUCTION

One of the progressive developments in recent criminal law and procedure
has been the growth of psychiatry as a hand-maiden of the courts. This
trend is reflected in legal problems, and in the establishment of cooperating
committees of the American Bar Association and the American Psychiatric
Association. This branch of the Law of Persons clearly concerns itself with
a significant aspect of human behavior, so that ultimate influences from a
psychological era were to be expected.
More recently this evolution has found expression in statutory amendments
designed to furnish a more up-to-date, competent and unbiased expert opinion on the question of insanity in criminal cases. In New York a campaign
to abolish the lunacy commission system led to the passage of the so-called
Desmond Law which provides a completely new and exclusive system by
which criminal courts may obtain expert medical opinion on the question of
the present mental condition of any defendant.
The political objective of the legislation appears to have affected the perspective of the Legislature. This is noticeable in the drafting of the new
provisions of the Criminal Code, which reveals conflicting concepts of procedure and historical background. The first six months of practice under
the new procedure have evoked a number of complaints from defendants
and a diversity of views and methods among the different courts and hospitals.
The largest bone of contention appears to be the question concerning the
proper method of examination and final disposition of the issue. On the
one hand, there is the position that the new procedure expressed in the 1939
amendments to the Code of Criminal Procedure has finally acknowledged
the psychiatrists as the only valid source of expert opinion upon the question
of insanity in criminal cases, and that the subject should be decided by a
purely medical approach concluded by an advisory opinion to the court. The
opposition, generally represented by the defendants' counsel, responds with
the view that this legislation appears to provide for a quasi-administrative
*This article was accepted by the New York University Law School, June, 1940 as a
thesis for a degree of Doctor of Juridical Science (S.J.D.).
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or quasi-judicial proceeding. Their reaction seems to be that any determination of this issue directly affects the liberty and property of the defendants
in criminal cases. In any event, this view entails a demand that the examinations of the doctors be formal and subject to most of the strictures of court
proceedings.
This dissertation is offered as an analysis of the problem put by such conflict of medico-legal concepts, and may serve as a clarification of the nature
and character of the psychiatrists' role in the criminal law.
I.

STATEMENT OF PROBLEM

It has long been a fundamental principle of the common law that a person
confined on a criminal charge cannot be tried, sentenced or punished for such
crime while he is in such state of idiocy, imbecility or insanity as to be incapable of understanding the proceeding or making his defense.1 The reasons
for this rule at common law were that it was contrary to natural justice to
2
try a man who could not make a defense due to present insanity, although
3
he might have one, or to sentence a man when he might have something
to say in his own behalf to arrest judgment were he not mentally disordered. 4
This principle, established in New York at an early date by the courts, 5
is now embodied in Section 1120 of the Penal Code, 6 and is found in the
common law or statutes of every state in the United States. 7 But, although
the acceptance of this principle is unanimous, its concrete application is found
to vary inversely to the constancy of the principle itself. For, while the
decision as to the defendant's legal responsibility involves a legal as well as
a medical determination, the decision of his present insanity is purely a
medical determination.8 The legislatures of the various states, well aware
of the need for psychiatrists and medical experts in the determination of
present insanity,9 fully conscious of the interrelation of court and doctor in
'Freeman v. People, 4 Denio 9 (N. Y. 1847) ; I HALE P. C. 45; WEIHOFEN, INSANrrY
AS2 A DEFENSE IN CRIMINAL LAw (1933) 333 et seq.
By "present insanity," throughout this treatise,, is meant insanity which is evidenced
at any time before, during or after the trial of the criminal charge, but subsequent to
the date of commission of the crime; by "past insanity" is meant insanity at the time of
commission of the crime. Incompetency is excluded from this discussion save where
specifically discussed.
Comm. 303, 304, 306.
31
4 BL.
WEIHOFEN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 334.
Freeman v. People, 4 Denio 9 (N. Y. 1847).
6N. Y. PEN. LAW § 1120: "A person incapable, because of mental defect or insanity, of
understanding the proceeding, of making his defense, cannot be tried, sentenced or punished." This section is substantially derived from REv. STAT. c. 1, pt. 4, § 2 [Laws 1852] ;
CODE § 21 [Laws 1881, c. 6761; and PEN. CODE §§ 20, 21 [Laws 1884, c. 384, § 1].
PEN.
7
E.g., OHIO GEN. CODE ANN. (Page, 1939) §§ 13440-13441-1.
8Note (1939) 39 COL. L. Rav. 1260, 1267.
9
See Weihofen, An Alternative to the Battle of Experts: Hospital Examination of
Criminal Defendants Before Trial (1935) 2 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 419, 422.
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mental cases, and desirous of securing proper treatment for the criminal
insane, have but recently begun to provide the courts with the proper ingtrumentalities' ° for deciding the issue of present insanity in criminal cases.-1
12
The New York legislature has not been lax in enacting laws in this field,
and, at present, Sections 658 to 662d,'3 and 87014 of the Code of Criminal
i 0 There are court diagnostic clinics for defendants in at least three states: Michigan
[Recorder's Court, Detroit]; Illinois [Criminal Court, Chicago]; New York [Court of
General Sessions, New York City].
"Six states [Delaware, Florida, Mississippi, Oregon, Vermont, Washington] had no
statutory provisions for the method of decision of the issue of present insanity in 1937.
By 1939, of these six, three states had enacted laws regulating the method of trial "of
this issue. [Fla. Sess. Laws 1939, c. 19554, § 203; Ore. Sess. Laws, 1937, c. 293, §§ 1, 2;
Vt. Public Laws 1933, as amended by Pub. Acts No. 52, §§ 2429, 4020]. The remaming
three states, failing to recognize the medical problem involved, leave the method of
determination of this issue in the discretion of the court, as at common law. See pp. 422
et seq., infra.
12E.g., see N. Y. CODE CRm. Paoc. §§ 658, 870, prior to repeal by N. Y. Laws 1939,
c. 861.
13N. Y. Laws 1939, c. 861, §§ 658-662d.
Section 658: "If at any time before final judgment it shall appear to the court having
jurisdiction of the person of a defendant indicted for a felony or misdemeanor that thdre
is reasonable ground for believing that [a] defendant is in such state ... of ... insanity
that he is incapable of understanding the . ..proceedings ...the court, upon its own
motion, or that of the district attorney or the defendant, may, in its discretion. order such
defendant to be examined to determine the question of his sanity." (Italics supplied.)
Section 659: " . .. Such examination shall be made as follows: .. . [by two qualified
psychiatrists of the division of psychiatry of the Department of Hospitals in cases in
New York City]."
Section 661: "Procedure: Powers of Examiners: . . . [No definite procedure for the
examination is outlined. Examinations may be made either in the place where the defendant is confined or within a hospital. The examining psychiatrists must take the oath
of referees, may examine witnesses, administer oaths, and compel the attendance of witnesses, and the production of books, papers, etc., deemed relevant or material.]"
Section 662: "Upon the completion of such examination ... the superintendent of the
hospital . ..must forthwith transmit to the court a . . .complete report . ..including
the findings of the qualified psychiatrists ... that the defendant is, or is not ... in such
state of ... insanity . . . [as to be tried or not tried under N. Y. PEN. CODE § 1120J."
"Such report shall include a recommendation as to which institution defendant should
be sent if committed. . . . If such psychiatrists find the defendant sane . .. , the proceedings against such defendant shall be resumed as if no examination had been ordered.
If the court does not concur with the findings of the psychiatrists, or if the two psychiatrists do not agree..., the proceedings against such defendant may be resumed . . . or
the court may request ... a third psychiatrist to examine .. .and .. .report. ..."
Section 662a: Procedure where Defendant is found insane. "If two ... psychiatrists
certify that such defendant is [insane], and the court after giving the district attorney
and [defendant's] counsel ... opportunity to be heard..., concurs in such findings, the
trial must be suspended until [the defendant] becomes sane and [the defendant shall be
committed] .. .to a state hospital for the insane [or for the criminally insane] ...
[If the defendant becomes sane] the superintendent of the hospital ...shall inform the
court and the district attorney ...whereupon the proceedings ... shall be resumed. ..."
Section 662d: "[These provisions] shall not be deemed to be superseded by any proof the mental hygiene law or other statute unless [specified]. ..."
vision
4
1 N. Y. Laws 1939, c. 861, § 870: Court Order for Examination as to Sanity of a
Defendant not under indictment. "If ...a defendant fls] charged with a felony or a misdemeanor but not under indictnent . . . .or charged with an offense not a crime . . .
[the court may use the same procedure specified in Section 658 to 662d, supra note 13]."
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Procedure attempt to provide the courts with the proper machinery for the
determination of the present mental condition of defendanis confined, or
held, on criminal charges.
But, whether due to the method of enactment of these sections, 15 or to
the inherent nature of the problem, the present statute raises serious questions
in constitutional and administrative law. A study of the "hearing" or determination provisions of Sections 658 to 662d reveals that the following issues,
necessarily involved in the determination of present insanity, have been either
unclearly treated or entirely neglected:
(1) Is there a right to a jury trial of the issue of present insanity
accorded
6
a) By the Constitution of New York' or the United States,"
8
b) By New York statutes.'
(2) If there is such a right, is the verdict of the jury
a) Binding on the court, or
b) Advisory to the court.
(3) If there is no right to a jury trial, is there a right to an examination by qualified medical experts
a) Under the constitutions, or
b) Under the statutes.
(4) If there is such right in (3), must the examination be a formal
one, on notice and by hearing,
a) Under the constitutions, or
b) Under the statutes.
Is the report at the conclusion of the examination in (4) bind(5)
ing on the court
a) If the report is "insanity,"
b) If the report is "sanity."
(6) If the rights in (1) to (5) are non:existent, then the court is
the final arbiter. What, then, are the minimal requirements in the determination by the court
a) Under the constitutions, or
b) Under the statutes.
'15 See Note (1939) 39 COL. L. REV. 1260, 1262, note 18, to the effect that the present
sections, here considered, were the result of "buck-passing" by the legislature to the
executive and, consequently, could not be models of perfection in draftsmanship.
'ON. Y. CoNsT., Art. 1, § 2: "Trial by jury in all cases in which it has heretofore been
guaranteed by constitutional provision shall remain inviolate forever; . . . "
17U. S. CONST. Art. XIV: "No State shall deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law."
18N. Y. CODE CRim. PRoc. §§ 658, 870 (1936); N. Y. CODE CRIM. PRoc. §§ 658-662d,
870 (1939), cited upra notes 13 and 14.
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(7) How can a defendant appeal from an adverse decision of his
mental condition by the court?
These issues are vital, for, as a consequence of their decision, a defendant
may be put to trial of the criminal charge while insane, or be incarcerated
for present insanity in a state hospital, although sane, for a longer period
of time than the maximum sentence for the criminal charge, without the
minimal requirements of due process and fair hearings having been met.' 9
These issues, moreover, have received scant attention by the courts and legal
writers, with reference to the 1939 additions to the New York Code of
Criminal Procedure; and the slight attention accorded has served not to
clarify but to confuse the problems involved. Thus, in dealing with the grant
20
of powers to the psychiatrists to call witnesses and compel their attendance,
one writer 21 states that the courts may interpret those provisions as:
equivalent to a requirement that the psychiatrists shall in each
case conduct their examination in the form of a quasi-judicial hearing,
affording in each instance an opportunity for the district attorney and
counsel for the defendant to be heard.... [But] constitutional requirements of 'an opportunity to appear and be heard' are amply met by
allowing both the district attorney and the defendant to be heard before
the court confirms or rejects a finding of insanity ... .
The courts, in the few decisions available since the passage of these sections, have had requests to interpret the statutes and lay down a mode of
procedure for the psychiatrists, district attorney and defense counsel. Thus,
in People v. Pershaecns the corporation counsel made application to the court
to advise the psychiatrists as to whether they must hold formal hearings and
examinations, as they saw fit,24 but that case, at best, affects only that particular proceeding and is not an authoritative holding as to any of the provisions of the new sections of the Code. On the other hand, in People v.
V9 See proposed amendments to Sections 658-662d, infra notes 208, 209, 212, 218, 223,
230,
20 235, 236, 238, 239, 241.
N. Y. CODE Cram. PRoc. § 661.
21
Note (1939) 39 CoL. L. REv. 1260, 1265, 1266.
22
Assuming that this is true, what should be done if the psychiatrists report defendant
sane? The Code [Section 662, supra note 13] does not provide for a hearing by the court
in such cases. Section 662a requires a hearing by courts only if the report is insanity and
is confirmed. The Code, therefore, entirely neglects the probability that the putting to
trial of a person (allegedly insane) is a deprivation of life and liberty without due process
of law. If the defendant is, in fact, incapable of consulting with counsel, he is deprived
of his right to be represented by counsel in a criminal case-a right which is constitutionally guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. See Powell v. Alabama, 296 U. S.412,
59 Sup. Ct. 280 (1936). On the effect of the psychiatrists' -reports on the courts, generally,
see Note (1937) 37 COL. L. REv. 153 et seq. (Sections 658 and 870 in 1936).
Misc. 324, 15 N. Y. S. (2d) 215 (Gen. Sess. N. Y. 1939).
23172
24
In New York City, the corporation counsel is to assist the psychiatrists examining
a defendant, as provided by N. Y. CODE CRrm. PRoc. § 659.
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O'Connor25 an informal examination was held by the psychiatrists but the

Justice required an open hearing in court and called in the psychiatrists to
reiterate, on the witness stand, what they had written in their report of
26
insanity.
Other instances of confusion, besides those apparent on the mere reading
and study of Sections 658 to 662d, and 870, as to the type of hearing to be
accorded a defendant respecting his present mental condition, are not lacking;27 but the illustrations mentioned serve to indicate the substance of the
questions herein discussed. To answer these questions, one must go back to
the earliest times and trace the growth and change of these types of hearings
in New York and other states. But, before such a consideration, there are
four other types of hearings of lunacy or insanity covered by law,28 which
must, for cogent reasons, be distinguished from and not confused with the
hearings on, or trial of, the corollary issue of present insanity.
The first of these hearings is that type accorded by the Mental Hygiene
Law. Under this law any person alleged, on application to the court, to be
insane or mentally defective, 29 may be summarily committed by the court
to a state institution, if he is not being held on a criminal charge.30 Upon
the demand of the alleged insane or mentally defective person the court may
hold a hearing and take evidence in or out of court, but this hearing and
the determination to commit the defendant is not an adjudication of his
present insanity.3 1 However, within thirty days of the signing of the order
of commitment, the committed person, on request, must be granted a "rehearing" 32 by any justice of the Supreme Court of New York other than
2516
N. Y. S. (2d) 156 (Co. Ct. Queens 1939).
2
61f the statute requires only a report for the advice of the court, it would seem needless duplication to resort to examination and cross-examination of doctors in a formal
corollary proceeding in the criminal court. The reason for this application of the rigid
forms of criminal procedure and substantive law to the preliminary issue of present insanity is to be found in the court's mistaken view of the insanity issue as a part of the
substance of the criminal charge, and the fear that no commitment of an insane defendant
to 27
a hospital would be a valid judicial act unless based on something akin to a trial.
See pp. 402-404, infra.
28
1.e.: (1) On the issue of insanity where there is an application for commitment of
a person who, although insane, is not held on a criminal charge, in accordance with the
New York Mental Hygiene Law; (2) On the issue of feeblemindedness under the
(former) New York Insanity Law; (3) On the issue of insanity (won compos nzentis)
before the appointment of a committee of the :person and/or property of an incompetent
under Section 1364 of the Civil Practice Act; and (4) On the issue of past insanity
under Section 1129 of the Penal Code (which embodies the common law rule as to insanity at the time of an act of crime).
29N. Y. MENT. HYG.LAw §§ 70, 121, as amended 1933.
83101d., §§ 74, 124.
32 Finch v. Goldstein, 245 N. Y. 300, 157 N. E. 146 (1927).
1t is not a "Re"-hearing in reality, but the first hearing, since the so-called hearing
before the committing justice is not a constitutional necessity. See Sporza v. Bank, 192
N. Y. 8, 84 N. E. 406 (1906).
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the one who committed him. At this hearing, the defendant has the right
to a jury trial on the issue of his present insanity"3 in the same manner as
if this were a special proceeding to secure the appointment of a committee
for an incompetent. 34 The court is bound by the verdict of the jury, whether
it be sanity or insanity, the jury trial granted by this law and by the Civil
Practice Act being regular, non-advisory jury trials.35 If the jury finds the
defendant insane, and he is then remanded to the state institution, he may
have a writ of habeas corpus at any time he believes he has again regained
normal mental order.3" Although the decision on the writ is usually summary,37 the court may call a jury to render an advisory opinion on the defendant's present mental condition, but their verdict cannot bind the court.38
The proceedings under these statutes are clearly defined and the hearings
by court and jury are specifically provided for, leaving no "hearing" questions
to be answered. The preliminary commitment by the court without notice
and hearing is constitutional, being merely temporary and for the protection
of society and the deiendant, 39 and the right of the defendant to his liberty
is constitutionally protected by the use of the constitutional jury on demand.
A comparison of the provisions of the Criminal Code [Sections 658-662d,
870] with those of the Mental Hygiene Law as to the nature of the judicial
or quasi-judicial hearing accorded, leaves one question to be answered. Why
the jury trial under the latter and not under the former ?40 Insofar as the
decision of the question of present insanity in criminal cases is concerned,
the weight of authority holds that this issue is ancillary to the trial of the
criminal charge, and merely a civil proceeding. 4' Thus it would seem as
though the proceedings under the Criminal Code and Mental Hygiene Law
partake of a similar character-civil-and should be identical but for the
specific provision in the Code and the Mental Hygiene Law that the Mental
42
Hygiene Law is not applicable to persons in confinement on criminal charges.
As a practical matter it may well be that defendants held on criminal charges
33

N. Y.

MENT. HYG.

LAW §§ 76, 125, as amended 1933.

34N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 1364.
35
See NEW YORK STATE LAW REIwSION COMMIssION REPORT (1939)

353 et seq.;
Matter of Walker, 57 App. Div. 1, 61 N. Y. Supp. 647 (4th Dep't 1900) ; Parker v.
Hospital, 50 App. Div. 622 (4th Dep't 1897).
SON. Y. MENT. HYG. LAW § 204, as amended 1933.
37
See N. Y. Civ. PpAc. AcT § 1259.
3SHoff v. State, 279 N. Y. 490, 18 N. E. (2d) 671 (1939) ; People ex rel. Woodbury v.
Hendrick, 216 N. Y. 339. 109 N. E. 486 (1915).
39
40 Stuart v. Palmer, 74 N. Y. 183, 30 Am. Rep. 289 (1878).
Under the 1936 provisions of N. Y. CODE CRIA. PROC. § 870, par. 2, the court inust
call a jury on the demand of the defendant. It is questionable whether this jury was to
render
an advisory or binding verdict. See note (1937) 37 COL. L. Rv. 151, notes 2-6.
41
See In re Bresee, 82 Iowa 573, 48 N. W. 991 (1891) ; Gaston v. Babcock, 6 Wis. 503
(1888).
Contra: State v. Lange, 168 La. 958, 123 So. 639 (1928). See infra note 71.
42 N. Y. CODE CEMi. PRoc. § 662d (1939).
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are more dangerous to society, if presently insane, than those not so held.
But this distinction in potentiality of danger to the public at large does not
appear to be articulated by the granting of a jury trial in the one case and
not in the other. True, the non-criminally insane person may be less easily
committed by jury than by court or psychiatrist, but since present insanity
is purely a medical question it would appear that both types of defendants
should be accorded similar hearings by psychiatrists. Whatever may possibly
be said about the divergence in treatment of the criminally and non-criminally
insane, it is apparent that under the present New York statutes the two types
of insane persons will, and must, be accorded different hearings. The issue
with which this paper is solely concerned 'is that of the hearings accorded
the criminally insane, and it must be kept in mind throughout that, due to
the statutes discussed above, the non-criminally insane cases are to be distinguished from those dealing with hearings on the issue of present criminal
insanity.
The second type of hearing to be contrasted to and distinguished from the
present insanity hearings under discussion is that on the issue of feeblemindedness under the old New York Insanity Law. 43 Under this statute the
courts were permitted to commit non-criminally feebleminded persons after
a hearing on notice in open court. It has been clearly held44 that the federal
and state constitutions do not preserve the right to a jury trial of the issue
of feeblemindedness since the jury had not been so used at common law
before the adoption of the constitutions. 45 Feeblemindedness, at common law,
was not a ground for commitment to an asylum, and consequently any
procedure which is fair-gives notice to the defendant with an opportunity
to be heard-is constitutional. 46 However, insanity-the present insanity
which results in the suspension of a criminal trial of the insane person-was
known and recognized at common law. 47 Thus, the type of hearing to be
accorded in the former class of cases will depend upon the entire absence of
such procedure at common law48 whereas that in the latter must substantially
43

N. Y. STATE CHArTms LAW § 461.
1n re Miller [Matter of Perkins], 105 Misc. 534, 173 N. Y. Supp. 520 (Sup. Ct.

44

1919).
45

Accord, People v. Presmeyer, 59 N. Y. 92 (1874); cf. John v. Paullin, 231 U. S.
583, 34 Sup. Ct. 178 (1913).
46Stuart v. Palmer, 74 N. Y. 19, 30 Am. St. Rep. 289 (1878). But cf. Wynehamer v.
People,
13 N. Y. 378 (1856).
47
Bateman's Case, 11 How. St. Tr. 467, 474-476 (1685) ; Hamilton v. Traber, 78 Md.
34, 27 Atl. 229 (1893) ; 1 HALE P. C. 35.
48If at common law there was no jury trial accorded in this type of proceeding, none
need be granted today. Simon v. Craft, 182 U. S. 427, 21 Sup. Ct. 836 (1901). But if
the defendant's rights to life, liberty and property are affected directly by the hearing and
order thereon, then there must-be an opportunity to be heard under the "due process"
clause. Simon v. Craft, supra. Thus, a statute providing for commitment (permanent),
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follow the procedure at common law. It is, therefore, apparent that the civil
commitment statutes, and cases dealing with the degrees of mental defectiveness cannot be cited as authorities in criminally insane commitments and thus
must be distinguished from these latter cases.
The third type of hearing to be mentioned here as distinct from those
provided for by the present Code of Criminal Procedure of New York, is
the hearing leading to the judicial determination of the fact of incompetency
and the consequent appointment of a committee of the person and/or property
of the incompetent person. In New York a guardian cannot be appointed
until there has been a-jury trial of the issue of incompetency, but this requirement is statutory. 49 Recent additions to this statute, however, dispensing
with the right to trial by jury in certain incompetency cases,5" have raised
the serious question whether the trial by jury must be accorded as a matter
of right. This question has been the subject of recent investigation by the
New York State Law Revision Commission.51 The fruit of this research
has been the demonstration that the right to jury trial of the issue of incompetency must be granted by the courts and legislature under our constitution.
At common law, in England, the Chancery Court had no jurisdiction, inherently, over idiots and lunatics. The jurisdiction exercised by the Lord
Chancellor over lunatics was possessed not judicially, but by virtue of the
fact that the King, as parens patriae,the custodian of lunatics, had delegated
to the Chancellor-as the King's first personal representative-the King's
power over lunatics by his sign manual. 52 Since the King had no power to
deal with lunatics until lunacy had been established, and it had long been
the custom to grant a jury trial of the issue of lunacy, the Chancellor had
no jurisdiction until a jury had first found the fact of lunacy. The verdict
of the jury was not in aid of the Chancellor's conscience, but served to form
the basis for any future acts by the Chancellor. This being the common law
in England at the date of the entrance of the American colonies into the
union, it is to be followed by virtue of its codification by the New York
State Constitution of 1777, which preserved the right to jury trial in all eases
"where heretofore used."
In determining whether the right to jury trial in the ordinary incompetency
proceeding is accorded by the Constitution, the New York Law Revision
Commission was faced with four main problems:
without the chance to be heard is unconstitutional [Re Michael Gannon, 16 R. I. 12
(1889)] and if the statute is silent as to opportunity to be heard the court will read in this
requirement to preserve the constitutionality thereof. Re Lydia Ann Allen, 82 Vt. 365, 73
Ati. 1078 (1909).
49N. Y. CIv. PRAc. AcT § 1364, directing a regular jury, or one secured by commission
to the sheriff, to try the issue of incompetency.
50N.
Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT art. 81a.
51
NEw YoRx STATE LAW REVISION CommIssioN REPoRT (1939) 353-372.

62I.e., the great seal.
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(1) The state of the common law in England before 1777;
(2) The state of the common law in New York until 1874, the time
of the adoption of the first code provisions re incompetency trials ;53
(3) The confusing dicta in cases where deeds or contracts of incompetents were attempted to be set aside as voidable instruments;
(4) The confusing dicta in cases involving commitment for present
criminal insanity.
The first problem has already been discussed, and the second problem is
merely a continuation thereof and not germane to our immediate issue.54
The third problem was born in a group of cases dealing with civil incompetency in which the courts used such loose language in speaking of incompetency as would apparently authorize the proposition that at common law
an insand person was not entitled to a trial by jury, but only to notice and
judicial determination of the issue of insanity, lunacy or incompetency. 55
A common factual pattern in these cases is as follows:
'In 1900 L is committed to an asylum as insane under the New York
Insanity Law. In 1901 he conveys land to C. In 1902 a committee of the
person and property of L is duly appointed. The committee then brings suit
to have the conveyance set aside and offers the proof of commitment in 1900
and continual confinement thenceforth as evidence of incompetency at the
date of the conveyance. C then alleges that the evidence of commitment cannot be admitted because the proceedings there were unconstitutional, there
5
MUntil 1874 the New York Statutes pertaining to competency were silent as to the
method of appointing committees. In that year [Laws 1874, c. 446] the Chancellor was
granted the power to issue a commission to the sheriff to secure a jury to pass on the
issue of incompetency. The commission method was in use from 1874 to 1880 because
Chancery had no available machinery (a non-advisory jury) to decide the issue. When
the Supreme Court took over the powers of Chancery it still had no available machinery,
sitting as a court of equity. Thus, in 1880 the Code of Civil Procedure [Section 2327]
provided that the Supreme Court could use the commission method, or send the issue to be
heard by a regular jury at a trial term of the court. The latter method was cheaper
and faster, but to prevent embarrassment to certain defendants by the public airing of the
proceedings, the commission method was also retained. These provisions are substantially the same as those to be found in the present Section 1364 of the Civil Practice Act.
See, for an excellent discussion of incompetency in law, NEW YORK STATE LAw REvIsioN
CoamIssiON
REPORT (1939) 353-372.
54
See Matter of Barker, 2 Johns. Ch. 232 (N. Y. 1816) indicating that at common law
in New York there was a jury trial, of right, of the issue of incompetency.
55People v. Carll, 5 Johns. Ch. 118 (N. Y. 1821) was a bill by the committee of an
incompetent to set aside a deed previously made and delivered by the incompetent. The

court found insanity--i.e., incompetency-existed at the time of the making of the deed,

and ordered the transfer set aside. The defendant, in seeking to have the deed declared
valid, argued that the court must require a jury trial of the issue of insanity. The holding in this case is merely that a court of equity can set aside deeds of incompetents after
office found. The diction, however, is to the effect that the issue of insanity, in any case,
need never be tried by jury save where a divorce is sought. See also Matter of Colah,
3 Daly 529, 537 (N. Y. 1871) ; Hughes v. Jones, 116 N. Y. 67, 22 N. E. 446 (1889).,
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having been no notice, hearing or trial of the issue of insanity by a jury
before commitment. The holding on this allegation is merely that the prior
commitment proceedings are not open to collateral attack, but must be contested by a motion to reopen. The dictum is a broad statement that the commitment proceedings were constitutional even without notice and hearing.
Thus it is a grave error to follow the dicta in these cases in treating of
lunacy, incompetency or insanity in general. And, more particularly, even
if the dictum above were to be taken to rise to the level of a rationale (which
it cannot), it must be remembered that there can be no inference drawn from
incompetency cases which can be applicable to cases dealing solely with present criminal insanity. Although legal writings are available where the two
have been confused, 56 the Law Revision Commission has taken great care to
point out that the hearings accorded in criminal insanity have nothing to do
with hearings in proceedings for the appointment of committees for incompetent persons, due, primarily, to the fact that the history and growth of the
two procedures are basically divergent. 57
The fourth and last type of judicial hearing to be distinguished from that
in issue is the hearing accorded on i plea of insanity to a criminal charge.
The Penal Code of New York provides that no person may be convicted
if at the time of the act of crime he was legally irresponsible; and that a
person who cannot understand the proceedings may not be put to trial, etc.5 s
The first provision is a codification of the common law rule of McNaghte.'s
Case,5 9 and is a rule of substantive law directly involved in the trial of the
criminal charge. The second provision is a rule of procedural law-a corollary
5

6See, especially, Note (1932) 80 U. OF PA. L. REv. 556, 560, 562, "Most states have

statutes in ...

proceedings ,.

. [for appointment of guardians] .

..

for an incompetent.

• . . There is a split of opinion as to whether a jury trial in a lunacy proceeding is- a
matter of right. ... Some cases hold that it depends on the status of the common law at
the time jury'trials were given as a matter of right by [state] constitution [citing Matter
of Perkins, 105 Misc. 534 (Sup. Ct. 1909)]. From the foregoing ... it would seem that
in some states [there will be] constitutional difficulties [if no jury trial is provided in the
proceedings on incompetency] [citing State v. Billings, 55 Minn. 467, 57 N. W. 206
(1893) ; Ex Parte Dagely, 35 Okla. 180, 128 Pac. 699 (1912) ; White v. White, 108 Tex.
570, 196 S. W. 508 (1917) ; In re Brown, 39 Wash. 160, 81 Pac. 552 (1905))." All of
the cases cited in this article deal with the commitment to an asylum of criminally or
civilly insane persons. None deals with hearings on appointments of committees for incompetents.
5
7NENv YORK STATE LAw REViSiON Co mIssloN REPORT (1939) 353, 359, note 16:
"It has been said that it [jury trial] is not a matter of right: It re Brown, 39 Wash.
160 (1905) ; Ex parte Dagely, 35 Okla. 180 (1912) ; but in these cases the question decided was whether there is a right to jury trial before commitment and not . . . a right
... before the appointment of a committee.... See Note (1932) 80 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 556,
562-3-the cases cited there, as indicated in this footnote, do not sustain the proposition
that there was no right to jury trial before the appointment of a committee." Also see
infra
5 8 pp. 390 et seq.
N. Y. PEN. CODE § 1120. See supra note 6.
5910 Cl. & F. 200 (H. L. 1843).
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to the main question of guilt-and has no direct bearing on the trial on the
merits.60 There is no doubt that the issue of insanity at the time of the act
of crime .must be tried by a jury.61 Although there have been enactments
authorizing the court to allow psychiatrists to render advisory reports on
both questions 62 -that of past as well as present insanity-the psychiatrists'
verdict can merely be advisory to the jury. The prime reason for this hearing by jury is that under a constitutional provision preserving the right to
jury trial as heretofore used or constitutionally guaranteed, the issue of past
insanity is part and parcel of the criminal case-as at common law-and jury
trial on that issue must consequently be accorded.
Thus, although the trial of the issues of past and present insanity may be
provided for in the same sections of a criminal code, as in Louisiana,6 different considerations of constitutionality must apply to each issue. The
Louisiana code provides that insanity as a defence, or as a reason for suspension of trial, must be raised by a special plea of insanity,6 4 and both issues
must be disposed of prior to trial. If such plea is filed, two superintendents
of state hospitals, with one coroner of the parish, constitute a lunacy commission to try the plea. 5 The commission is freely to examine the defendant
and may compel witnesses to attend. 66 If the commission reports the defendant
presently insane, or insane at the time of the act, he is committed and held
until discharged by law. If reported sane at both periods of time the trial
proceeds in accordance with the next article.6 7 Under the latter article it is
provided that every plea of insanity shall be tried by a judge, or jury, dependent upon the method by which the criminal charge itself is triable under
6OPeople v. Farmer, 194 N. Y. 215, 87 N. E. 457 (1909). The bearing is indirect.
Thus, if a defendant is presently insane but nonetheless put on trial, he is in all probability incapable of consulting with counsel, and may consequently lose the opportunity to
present a real defense which he might have (as self-defense, past insanity, etc.). Again,
if found presently sane, and acquitted by the jury because of past insanity, the defendant
may still be committed to an asylum under N. Y. CODE CRIm. PROC. § 454; and the evidence as to present mental condition may be weighed by the court in its decision to commit defendant under Section 454. Also, People v. Haight, 3 N. Y. Cr. 60 (1883) holds
that evidence of present insanity is admissible on the trial as bearing on the question of
past insanity, or responsibility.
61
People v. Egnor, 175 N. Y. 419, 67 N. E. 906 (1903); WiHoFEN, op. cit. SUpra
note2 1.
6 N. Y. PFN. CODE § 836 [Laws 1910, c. 557] before repeal by N. Y. PEN. CODE § 870
[Laws 1936] provided solely for inquiry by lunacy commissioners into the question of
past insanity. The courts, however, permitted an inquiry into present insanity, likewise.
People v. Whitman, 149 Misc. 159, 266 N. Y. Supp. 844 (Gen. Sess. N. Y. 1933). The
present provisions, Sections 658-662d and Section 870 [Laws 1939, c. 861] allow an
examination
and hearing by psychiatrists on the issue of present insanity only,
63
LA. CODE CRIM. PROc. ANN. (Dart, 1932) Arts. 267-273.

64
65Article

267.
Article 268.
66Ibid.
67Ibid.
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the state constitution and statutes."" If the defendant is found presently
insane by judge or jury, as the case may be, he is then committed until he
again becomes sane or until the District Attorney moves the case for trial.
When the District Attorney so moves, then the whole procedure outlined
above is recommenced and followed anew, 69 and no ruling by the court on
any phase of the plea of insanity is reviewable by an appellate court until
sentence has been passed.
This statute is novel in that it makes the lunacy commission's report binding upon the state and the defendant where the report is insanity at any time,
and yet does not bind the defendant where the report is sanity at either time.
The attempt, therefore, has been to constitute the commission a true admin0
istrative quasi-judicial board for one purpose, but not for the other3
A consideration of the statutes of Louisiana and comparison with those in
New York brings us to a serious question: Is the hearing accorded under
these provisions a true administrative hearing as that term is commonly
understood in the field of administrative law generally? Although this problem will be discussed in more detail in the intensive study of the New York
laws, it is important that we review the salient principles of administrative
law relevant to this issue.
It is an accepted principle of law that an administrative agency is constituted a quasi-judicial tribunal only where the statute creating the agency hias
endowed it with quasi-judicial functions. 71 The statute usually does not expressly state that the agency is a .quasi-judicial one; nor are the powers
GsArticle 269.
09
Article 270.
70In State v. Burris, 169 La. 520, 125 So. 580 (1929), defendant, indicted for murder,
set up a special plea of insanity under the statutes discussed above. The commission
found him presently sane, but insane at the time of-the act of crime. Defendant moved
to be committed under Articles 268-273, but the court refused, holding the articles unconstitutional. On mandamus, the decision was reversed and defendant committed. The
statute was declared constitutional, even though the state has no appeal from the commission finding of insanity, past or present. The Louisiana constitution (Art. 1, § 41]
provides for jury trial in criminal cases, but the decision to commit for insanity decides
only a preliminary issue, not involved in the criminal case. If the defendant is brought
back for trial, when sane, the finding of the commission as to past insanity is not res
judicata. It is merely a finding that defendant should be committed. Cf. State v. Lange,
168 La. 958, 123 So. 639 (1928). Quaere whether the statute will be held constitutional
if the reverse situation arises, i.e., the commission finds defendant presently insane, seeks
to commit him, and defendant claims he cannot be committed until a jury decides the
issue of present insanity. The opinion in State v. Burris, supra, seems to indicate that
the commission's finding is conclusive if the report is insanity. But there is no notice
and hearing provided for, and if the commission is regarded as a quasi-judicial tribunal,
it seems there is a constitutional objection, for the defendant is deprived of his liberty
an opportunity to be heard. See note 22 supra.
without
71
Carroll v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 218 N. Y. 435, 113 N. E. 507 (1916) ; GELLnoRN,
CASES AND MATERIALS oN ADMINISTRATIvE LAW (Unpublished Columbia Law School,
1939), pt. II.
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granted by the legislature defined in language of "quasi-judicial" or "nonjudicial." To decide whether a tribunal is in fact exercising quasi-judicial
functions two questions must be answered, namely: (1) Is the tribunal
granted the power finally to decide the issues involved; and (2) does the
decision of the tribunal directly affect the life, liberty or property of the
individual involved?72
To determine whether psychiatrists are exercising quasi-judicial functions
under the New York or Louisiana statutes, for example, one must look at the
finality of the effect of their examination, or hearings, or reports and determinations on the rights of defendants. Generally speaking, a preliminary
restraint or commitment decides nothing as to the capability of the defendant
to undergo trial or sentence. Preliminary restraints usually consist of the
confinement of the defendant for a short period of time for purposes of
examination and observation.7 3 This confinement not being final or determinative, the exercise of the power to order confinement does not constitute
a judicial or quasi-judicial function. Different results are achieved where
an order committing the defendant "until he becomes sane," or refusing
to commit and ordering the defendant to trial, is issued by psychiatrists or
courts. If the psychiatrists decide that the defendant is insane, and if their
decision is binding on the courts under the applicable statutes,74 then a commitment "until defendant becomes sufficiently sane to stand trial," cannot be
termed suspensory or temporary. The defendant may never regain sanity,
and therefore be confined for life, without notice and hearing. 75 On the other
hand, if there is a refusal to commit, then if the defendant in fact had a real
defense which he was prevented from asserting due to his incapacity to consult with and inform counsel, it would also appear that defendant is being
deprived of his right to a fair trial of the criminal charge.7 6 Both of these
situations where the defendant may be deprived of his liberty are aggravated
by the fact that a review of, or appeal from, the decisions of the psychiatrists
or courts (dependent upon which decision is final) is practically unavailable.
If the defendant is found presently sane, and yet asserts he is insane at the
criminal trial, he may only have a review of the refusal to stay proceedings,
generally, by. moving for a new trial and appealing from a denial of this
motion as an abuse of discretion.77 On the other hand, appellate courts are,
72

op. cit. . upra note 71, pts. I, II.
Under N. Y. CODE Clum. PRoc. §§ 658-662d (1936) the court could commit the defendant
for preliminary observation, without notice and hearing.
74
E.g., LA. CODE CUM. PRoC. ANN. (Dart, 1932) Arts. 268-273.
75
Other results flow from this commitment. There will be a consequent loss of evidence
and witnesses as time goes by. Further, the defendant may be held in the asylum for a
longer period of time than if serving the sentence which he could receive if found guilty
on76the crimi-nal charge.
Supra note 22.
77
Freeman v. People, 4 Denio 9 (N. Y. 1847).
GELLHORN,

73
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slow to reverse lower courts' decisions for abuse of such discretion. 78 And,
if defendant is found insane, and committed, there can be no appeal to a
higher court because the order to commit does not constitute a final judgment
in a criminal trial, but only an interlocutory decision on a preliminary issue."D
The sole relief in this case is on writ of habeas corpus, 0 which is a corrective
writ and not intended for ordinary review purposes, or on a certificate of
the superintendent of the hospital.s '
At all events, in the writer's judgment, a commitment or refusal to commit
for present insanity by psychiatrists8 2 or court8 3 is a final disposition, by the
appropriate arbiter under the statutes, directly affecting the life, liberty, or
property of the individual and, therefore, at least quasi-judicial in nature.
Consequently, refusals of, or orders for, commitment must be made-if permanent, until sanity is regained-on notice and hearing.
This premise being established, we must decide now what is the minimal
hearing which must be accorded to defendants, allegedly presently sane or
insane, under the Federal and State Constitutions, and determine whether
the state statutes preserve these minimal requirements.
The Federal Constitution 4 states that the right to jury trial in criminal
cases where used at common law is preserved. This provision, however,
applies only to criminal trials in United States courts.8 5 And although the
14th Amendment provides that no state shall deprive any person of life,
liberty or property without due process of law, this provision does not result
in a guarantee of jury trial, but only in an assurance that proceedings affecting the defendant's rights in a state court are fair, based on notice and an
opportunity to be heard.
The state constitutions ordinarily provide that the right to jury trial shall
be preserved, and that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law. 6 The prime purpose of these provisions is to
protect civil liberties in criminal cases. In order to ascertain whether a jury
trial must be accorded under the New York Constitution, one must look at
78
0ne shocking example of this laxity is found in State v. Kelly, 74 Vt. 278, 52 At.
4347 (1902).

9Freeman v. People, 4 Denio 9 (N. Y. 1847).
Ibid.
PRoc. § 622a.
8 21N. Y. CODE CuI.
LA. CODE CRam. PROC. ANN. (Dart, 1932) Arts. 268-273.
PRoc. § 661.
CODE
CRIm.
83N. Y.
84
Art. III, § 2, cl. 3.
85
Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U. S. 581, 20 Sup. Ct. 448 (1900) ; accord, Simon v. Craft, 182
80

8

U.86S. 427, 21 Sup. Ct. 836 (1904).

E.g., N. Y. CoNsT. Art. 1, § 2: "Trial by jury in all cases where it has heretofore
been guaranteed by constitutional provision shall remain inviolate forever; . . . " This
provision applies to every proceeding or action, civil or criminal. Colon v. Lisk, 153
N. Y. 188, 47 N. E. 302 (1897).
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the common law practice prior to the adoption of the constitution in 1777,
or at the state practice and statutes prior to the last repromulgation of the
constitution.8 7 This historical approach is in use in practically every state
in the union.88 Thus, to determine the scope of the jury trial provisions in
state constitutions, it is necessary to discover what the common law was in
England, as well as in the Colonies before their entrance into the union and
their adoption of constitutions preserving the jury trial.8 9
II.

MINIMAL REQUISITES AND HEARINGS UNDER THE CONSTITUTIONS

In England prior to 1777, the situation frequently arose where a defendant
in a criminal case either stood mute and refused to plead, or was too mentally
disordered to understand what was taking place. 90 Although it appears that
a jury trial of the issue of incompetency was accorded as of right,9 ' the right
to such trial of the issue of present insanity in criminal cases is, at best,
undecided. In the Proceeding of John Frih 92 the court stated:
"Such is the humanity of the law of England, that . . .at the time
when the prisoner makes his defense . . .it is important to settle what
his state of mind is; ... therefore ... there ought now to be an inquiry
made, touching the sanity of this man at this time; . . .then get a jury

together to inquire into the present state of his mind; the twelve men
that are here will do ....93
"The Jury sworn as follows:--'You shall . . .inquire . . . [for] the
King, whether.., the prisoner... be of sound mind ....
and a true
verdict give ....
so help you God .....

"Jury: My Lord, we are all of opinion that the prisoner is quite
insane.
"Court: He must be remanded for the present." 94
87
PRoBmMs RELATING TO THE BILL OF RIGHTS (N. Y. Const. Convention Committee
1938)
Vol. VI, pp. 6-10, 18-24.
88
See People v. Bellinger, 269 N. Y. 265, 199 N. E. 213 (1935) ; Duffy v. People, 6
Hill 75 (N. Y. 1843); Myers, The Constitutional Guarantee of Trial by Jury in New
York
89 (1937) 7 BROOKLYN L. REV. 180.
See, generally, Goebels, Development of Legal Institutions (Unpublished thesis in

Columbia Law School Library, 1939).
902 HUME's C. P. 342: "... . At receiving the verdict of the jury in the case of Thomas
Gray, such objection [present insanity] was raised, and the diet [cause] adjourned by the
Court from time to time, till at last ...

the case was dropped from the record .. . and

I have not been able to discover if it ever came to issue....
34,9135.

"

And see 1

N. Y. STATE LAw RE IsioN CoMMIssIoN REPORT (1939) 353, 362.
CASES IN CHANCERY IN GREAT BRITAIN (1724-1733) 47: "Special return

HALE

See

P. C.

SELECTED

was made to a
commission of lunacy, which was filed. Chancellor: 'He must be found either mad or not
mad.... It [the return] must be quashed, and an alias commission go. . .

.'"

See also-

in the Matter of Heli, 3 Atk. 635, 26 Eng. Rep. 1165 (Ch. 1748) ; Bailiffs of Burford v.
Lenthall, 2 Atk. 551, 26 Eng. Rep. 731 (Ch. 1743).
9222 How. St. Tr. 307, 311 (1790).
9
31.e., the jurors already selected to try the criminal charge.
04
The prisoner was then removed.

INSANITY IN CRIMINAL CASES

1941]

It appears here that a jury trial was granted and the jury's verdict followed. 5 But in Batentan.'s Case90 no jury was called to try this issue, and
it is to be noted that it was not until 1800 that Parliament enacted a law
directing a jury trial in these cases.9 7 The statement in Batemnan's Case that
the calling of a jury is discretionary with the court, and the enactment of
the law of 1800 lead to the inference that the practice followed in the Frith
case was unusual, at least before 1777, in England. 98 The legal writers are
in accord with this proposition. Thus, Lord Hale states :99
100 But because there
"And ... such person ... shall not be tried ....
may be great fraud in this matter . . . the judge before such respite of

trial or judgment may do well to impanel a jury to inquire ex officio
touching such insanity, and whether it be real or counterfeit.
"... It seems in such a case it is prudence to swear an inquest . . .
to inquire touching his madness. . . . But in case a man in a phrenzy
and is put upon his trial,
happened by some oversight ... to plead ....
and it appears to the court . . . that he is mad, the judge in his discre-

tion' 01 may discharge the jury, and remit him to gaol to be tried after
...

recovery ....

",102

There are thus two conflicting sources of authority in England as to jury
trial of the present mental condition of criminal defendants. Perhaps the
authority weighs more heavily on the one side than on the other, but it is
certain that the state courts, when faced with conflicting authorities in the
law of England, may, and do, decide that the one or the other is the common
law of that state to the exclusion of the other; for the interpretation of
precedents and the doctrine of stare decisis readily give way to the predilec95But see 22 How. St. Tr. 1255: "It .

.

. seems .

.

. doubtful ....

if we have yet

sufficient authority [in Scotland] for annexing to the province of the jury, a pre-judicial
inquiry of this nature.... As . . . the man is under the eye of the . .. Court . .
there seems not to be any reasonable cause for jealousy of judges, . . . as in ... weigh-

ing the proof.. . [of] guilt or. . . innocence. And indeed, after his plea of insanity has
been repelled by the judge, the pannel [defendant] has still his refuge with the assize,
who may do with respect to his conviction, as they themselves shall see cause." (Italics
supplied.)
9011 How. St. Tr. 467, 474-6 (1685).
9739 & 40 GEO. III, c. 94 (1800).
sS5ee Shumway v. Shumway, 2 Vt. 339 (1876), discussing the English common law.

991 HALE P. C. 34, 35.
100
1.e., for the crime.
10 1

In accord, as to the court's discretion, see Bateman's Case, 11 How. St. Tr. 467,

474-6
02 (1685).

l But cf. 1 BL. Comm. 303-6: "[Before 1300 the Lords of the Manors took advantage
of idiots and lunatics by taking their property. Circa 1324, 17 Enw. 2, the Statute De
Prerogativa Regis was enacted. It gave the King custody over the estates of idiotsfools from birth-and lunatics-those with lucid intervals.] By the old common law there
is a writ de idiota inquirendo, to inquire whether a man be an idiot or not; . . . which
mnust be tried by a jury of twelve men: and, if they find him purii4lota, the profits of
his lands, and the custody of his person may be granted by the King to some subject .... "
(Italics added.)
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tions of any court. It is simple to adopt either view, because neither is the
exclusive one.

03

Thus, we shall expect to find some divergence in treatment by the various
state courts of the common law of England when faced with the problem of
what the state constitutional provision preserving the right to trial by jury
as at common law embraces. But, while examining state constitutional provisions, one caveat must be borne in mind. There are various forms of such
provisions, and differently worded provisions engender varied results. Thus,
the Wisconsin Constitution provides: "The right to jury trial shall remair4
inviolate and extend to all cases at law.'

04

Under this provision, the right

to trial by jury of the issue of present insanity, and even incompetency, is
of no consequence, since those issues are only involved in special proceedings,
not cases at law. 10 5 And where the jury trial is preserved in criminal prosecutions alone, the same holds true-a commitment being the result of a special
proceeding and not a trial of the criminal charge. °6
Finally, before discussing the common law of New York and other states,
it must be reiterated that in those states where the right to trial by jury is
preserved as heretofore used or constitutionally guaranteed in all proceedings
and actions, the common law of such states does not consist purely and simply
of the law of England before 1777, but all those statutes and laws of England
received in the colonies which were not repugnant to their constitutions at
the time of ratification. Thus, in Texas, where the jury trial provision was
first adopted in the Texas Constitution of 1840, the practice in Texas and
the applicable statutes are determinative of the type of hearing preserved,
and the common law of England prevails only in the absence of such statutes
and practice.'0 7
' 03
See, generally, Goebels, supra note 89.
104
Italics added.
05
' 06 Gaston v. Babcock, 6 Wis. 503 (1888).
1 See the Iowa Constitution as interpreted in In re Bresee, 82 Iowa 573, 48 N. W. 991
(1891).
107TWhite v. White, 108 Tex. 570, 196 S. W. 508 (1917). In this case, an act of Texas
[Tex. Acts 1913, c. 163] permitted a person, mentally disordered, to be committed civilly
after a determination on notice and hearing by a commission. The act was held unconstitutional since the right to trial by jury was preserved in all cases and proceedings by
the state constitution and, at the time of the adoption of this constitution, the jury trial
was utilized in Texas, in practice or by statute, or required by the common law. Contra:
Ex Parte Dagely, 35 Okla. 180, 128 Pac. 699 (1912) where the court said there was no
jury trial granted of this issue in that territory before the promulgation of the state con-

stitution, nor at common law in England. (The court does not cite any prior Oklahoma
or English authorities.) The statute involved [OKLA. Comp. LAws (1909) § 3701-20]
allowed commitment civilly without any notice and hearing whatsoever. (The Texas
Statute, supra, set up a regular quasi-judicial tribunal.) The court held the restriint
reasonable since only preliminary, with the statement that the restraint, if becoming permanent, could always be tested in a judicial hearing on writ of habeas corpus.
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III.

HEARINGS AT COMMON LAW: HEREIN OF THE NEW YORK
PRACTICE

No New York court has ever held that a jury trial is constitutionally required for the issue of present insanity in criminal cases. Although many
early cases merely indicate that no jury trial is required,10 8 People v.
Rhinelander0 9 is explicit on the point. Under a statutory provision allowing
the court to call in a lunacy commission to aid it in determining present insanity, 0 the defendant contended that the decision of the commission effectively bound the court. The court denied this contention in these terms:"'
"At common law the trial . . .of an insane person for a crime ...
was prohibited, and the court in which an indictment was pending might,
by aid of a jury, or by other discreet and proper methods in the discretion of the court, inquire into and determine the.question of sanity....
"*...[In] Freeman v. People (4 Denio,. 9), it was held that as the
statute ... did not state in what manner the fact of insanity should be
ascertained, that fact was to be ascertained as the common law provided.
"In no part of this chapter or in the section above referred to, does
it appear that the power to determine the question . . . [of insanity]
. ..is conferred on the commission, nor do I find any provision which
either takes from or in any way limits the power which has heretofore
been exercised by criminal courts, both at common law and by statutes
existing prior to the adoption of the Code, to inquire into such matters
by and with the aid of a jury,
' 2 or in such other way as may be found to
be discreet and convenient.""
Finally in 1891, the Court of Appeals intimated, in the well known case
of People v. McElvaine,"3 that the decision as to the use of a jury was properly in the discretion of the lower courts.
The rationale of the New York decisions is this: At common law in England the trial of the issue of present insanity was in the sound discretion
'0SFreeman v. People, 4 Denio 9 (N. Y. 1847) is often cited for the proposition, but
the statement therein is pure dictum. In that case, after arraignment and before trial,
defendant moved the court to impanel a jury to inquire as to the defendant's mental condition. The jury found defendant knew the difference between right and wrong. Counsel
moved the court to instruct the jury to determine defendant's present mental condition,
and not the issue of knowledge of right against wrong. This motion was denied and excepted to. The holding was that this ruling, if erroneous, had not been properly brought
before the court, the proper procedure being to move for a new trial and then have a writ
of error on the denial thereof. The question of the type of hearing to be accorded on the
issue of present insanity was not before the court. However, by way of dictum, the court,
at page 20, stated that the type of hearing to be allowed was in the court's discretion.
3092 N. Y. Cr. 335 (Gen. Sess. N. Y. 1884).
lION. Y. CODE CRIm. PRoc. § 658 (1881).

"'1People
v. Rhinelander, 2 N. Y. Cr. 335, 339 (Gen. Sess. N. Y. 1884).
" 2ltalics added. Cf. People v. Haight, 3 N. Y. Cr. 60 (1883).
113125 N. Y. 596, 600,. 601, 26 N. E. 929 (1891) ; accord, People v. Tobin, 176 N. Y.

278, 68 N. E. 359 (1903). See People ex reL Thaw v. Lamb, 118 N. Y. Supp. 389, 133
App. Div. 159 (2nd Dep't 1909), aff'd, 196 N. Y. 525, 89 N. E. 1109 (1910).
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of the court; whethef or not there existed a statute declaring that insane
persons were not to be tried," 4 it was the inherent right of the court to
suspend a trial if a man appeared insane; and it was also the inherent right
of the court to try the issue as it saw fit, so long as the decision thereon was
judicial in nature." 5
It appears that the overwhelming weight of authority accepts and follows
this rationale. Thus, in Wisconsin, a statute allowing the commitment of
criminally insane defendants by the court without a jury was declared constitutional since at common law there was no right to trial by jury in these
18
17
instances." 16 The same rule holds true in Massachusetts," Washington'
9
2
0
and Maryland" and in at least thirty other states.1 This is not to say that
insane defendants may be committed without notice and hearing, but merely
to point out that the hearing accorded is not one by a non-advisory jury.
Thus, in State ex rel. Blaisdell v. Billings121 a statute allowing civil commitment for insanity by the court on certificate of two physicians, without the
chance for the patient to be heard,'1 22 was held unconstitutional. Due process
under the constitution requires at least the right to have the opportunity
23

to be heard.1

From the above authorities it is apparent that a trial by'jury of the subsidiary issue of present insanity in criminal cases need not constitutionally
be accorded in most states. The problem of determining the type of hearing
which must be afforded, therefore, narrows down to the questions whether
constitutionally there need be any hearing at all and, if so, whether the decision of the question must be by a court or may permissibly be left to a
124
quasi-judicial tribunal, i.e., a jury of psychiatrists and/or psychologists.
Among those states where a jury trial has been declared not to be a neces4
"X
No such statute existed in England until 1800.
5
"1
See cases cited stpra note 113.
0
" OCrocker v. State, 60 Wis. 553, 19 N. W. 435 (1878), citing 1 HALE P. C. 33-35;

Freeman v. People, 2 N. Y. Cr. 335 (1847) ; Queen v. Goode, 7 A. & E. 536 (K. B.

1837).

117n re Dowdell, 169 Mass. 387, 47 N. E. 1033 (1897).

1181n re Brown, 39 Wash. 160, 81 Pac. 552 (1905).
119 See Hamilton v. Traber, 78 Md. 26, 27 Atl. 229 (1893).
120 Contra: White v. White, 108 Tex. 570, 196 S. W. 508 (1917). For a collection of
authorities in other states, consult WEIOFEN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 332 et seq.
12155

Minn. 467, 57 N. W. 206 (1893).

122 Minn. Gen. Stat. 1878, c. 80, § 3.
123State ex rel. Blaisdell v. Billings, 55 Minn. 467, 473, 57 N. W. 206: "Due process of
law requires an orderly proceeding adapted to the nature of the case, in which the citizen
has an opportunity to be heard. . . . defend, enforce, and protect his rights . . . [and the
tribunal
must proceed in due form of law]."
' 24This is the narrow constitutional problem. Once this has been answered the question remains as to what interpretation state courts will place 'upon the statutes which
grant more than the constitutional necessity.
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there are only two which have attempted to constitute psychiatrists

as administrative boards to determine the issues of insanity in criminal cases.
In Louisiana, as we have seen,'12 the commission is quasi-judicial for but
half the problem, since defendants may appeal to a jury where the commission finds present sanity. In Connecticut, the court appoints three reputable
doctors to examine defendants and hold hearings. Their findings are conclusive on the court. 27 The remaining forty-six states have no such provisions.' 28 As to whether statutes such as those of Louisiana and Connecticut
will be declared constitutional'2 if adopted in some form or another in the
various states it is this writer's firm belief that once the high barrier of jury
trial is cleared, then the commission quasi-judicial determination of insanity
will be declared constitutional. 130 So long as the commission, if it has the
power to commit permanently, acts only on notice and hearing,1 31 there is
no question but that a strictly judicial determination by a court' 32 will meet
the requirements of the Federal and State Constitutions. 33
With this constitutional background, the present state statutes may, now
be examined and passed upon with an eye to constitutional observance and,
which is more important, to determine their application in practice.
New York has been particularly active in legislation in this field. In 1842
there was enacted the first provision providing the court specifically with the
lunacy commission as an instrumentality for determining the mental condition of criminal defendants. 13 4 This provision was substantially embodied,
after slight changes,' 8 5 in the first Code of Criminal Procedure in the years
1880-1881.'13 Essentially, this section provided that where a defendant was
in confinement .under indictment and appeared at any time to be insane, the
court might appoint a commission to examine him as to his insanity at the
time of the offense and at present; and where defendant raised a special plea
of insanity to the indictment, the court might do likewise. 137 But, from the
125This excludes states such as Texas. See White v. White, 108 Tex. 570, 196 S. W.
508 (1917).
12GSupra p. 386. Cf. McNaboe Bill, S. B. No. 915 (1936).
127CoNN. GEN. STAT. (1918) § 6584.
128
For a classification and discussion of the statutes of these states, see p. 422 infra.
129
As in State v. Burris, 169 La. 520, 125 So. 580 (1929). See supra note 70.
130
See White v. White, 108 Tex. 570, 196 S.W. 508 (1917).
133 'See State ex rel. Blaisdell v. Billings, supra note 123.
1 2See discussion supra pp. 390-392.
33

= Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U. S.603, 20 Sup. Ct. 1025 (1900).

' 3 4Laws 1842, c. 135, § 32.

135 Laws 1874, c. 446, § 20, amending Laws 1871, c. 666, § 1.
136N. Y. CoDE CIim. Paoc. § 658 (Laws 1881], § 659.
137
As for persons held in confinement but not under indictment, see REv. STAT., pt. 1,
c. 20, § 34; as amended by Laws 1874, c. 446, § 26, Laws 1897, c. 451, § 1, Laws 1898,
c. 417, § 1, amended in 1909, 1910, 1924, 1933; known as N. Y. CoDE Caim. PROC. § 836
from 1881-1936, rexumbered as Section 870 by Laws 1936, amended Laws 1939, c. 861,
§ 870.
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very first year of these provisions-from 1842 to date-great difficulty and
88
confusion arose in the application of these laws.'
First there was the question whether these laws did not violate the constitutional provision with respect to jury trial. Although many New York
court decisions have been cited as authorities for the proposition that no jury
trial need be accorded, upon examination-especially of Freeman v. People,
People v. McElvaine, and People v. Rhinelander-it is found that no Court
of Appeals or Appellate Division case has ever directly held to that effect.
True, there are strong dicta rife in many cases to that effect, but no holding.
This is not to say that the dicta are incorrect. As already stated, it is this
writer's belief that no jury is constitutionally necessary in these proceedings.
The more difficult problem was whether a special plea of insanity, ipso
facto, or a motion for a commission, automatically compelled the court to
call in a commission in lunacy. Freeman v.People did not supply a solution
to this problem, the case going off on procedural grounds ;139 and even were
one to argue that the procedural ground dismissal was only one unimportant
factor, it is to be noted that the dictum went only so far as to state that the
court might use its discretion as to whether *it should call in a jury or commission, and did not state that the court might entirely refuse to have the
issue of present insanity tried by lunacy commission or jury. 140 People v.
Rhinelanider merely held that the court was not bound to follow a finding
of insanity by a commission, where the court found the defendant sufficiently
sane to undergo trial.
In People v. McElvaine, however, the problem was met, and the court
clearly held that it was discretionary with the trial tribunal to appoint or to
refuse to appoint the lunacy commission. Thus, if there were a reasonable
amount of evidence, especially of demeanor, before the court of first instance
to lead it to believe the defendant sane,1 41 then it might properly refuse to
call in a lunacy commission. 142 The court did not go into the related question,
i.e., that of the extent of this discretion, and when it would be declared to
8
13
See People v. Pershaec, 172 Misc. 324, 15 N. Y. S. (2d) 216 (Gen. Sess. N. Y.
1939).
'39See p. 393 supra.
1404 Denio 9, 20 et seq. (N. Y. 1847).
1411n the McElvahw case there had been a first trial, conviction and reversal. Thus at
the second trial the lower court had already seen the defendant and his actions, over a
period
of time, and might have formed a reasonable opinion as to his present sanity.
' 42Accord, People v. Tobin, 176 N. Y. 278, 68 N. E. 359 (1903) ; People v. Whitman,
149 Misc. 159, 267 N. Y. Supp. 1107 (Gen. Sess. N. Y. 1933); People v. White, 140
Misc. 701, 251 N. Y. Supp. 396 (Gen. Sess. N. Y. 1931). And in those twenty states
where a jury trial has been made mandatory by statute, the court has discretion to refuse
to call a jury. Rohn v. State, 186 Ala. 5, 65 So. 42 (1914) ; Bulger v. People, 61 Colo.
187, 156 Pac. 800 (1916) ; State v. Peterson, 25 Mont. 81, 63 Pac. 799 (1912) ; State v.
Harrison, 36 W. Va. 729, 15 S.E. 982 (1894). Contra: People v. Geary, 298 Ill.
236,
131 N. E. 652 (1921) ; but see People v. Preston, 345 Ill.
11, 177 N. E. 761 (1931).
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have been abused.1 43 In the McElvaine case, the lower court appears to have
relied solely upon the appearance and conduct of the defendant in arriving
at the decision to refuse to appoint the examiners in lunacy. Later, the custom
seems to have arisen of appointing doctors to inform the court as to defendant's mental condition and, if their informal report was insanity, the court
would then use the machinery of the Code. Thus, in People v. Tobin' 44
counsel for the defendant in a first degree murder trial asked the court to
appoint three competent doctors to determine whether the defendant was
presently sane. The court granted the request. Two doctors then reported
the defendant sane, and one insane. Counsel then moved the court to appoint
a lunacy commission under Sections 658 and 659. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the denial of this motion, stating that the appointment of the commission was in the discretion of the lower court under the statutes, and that
this discretion had been properly exercised,'145 since the two doctors' opinions
were based on affidavits and proofs which could reasonably have laid the
basis for the court's refusal to act.
Whatever may be the limits of the proper exercise of discretion in any
given case, it is apparent that no matter how strictly trial courts are held in
such exercise, the resulting protection to the defendant would be vitiated if
the report of the commission were made binding on the court. And, although
Section 658 provided in 1881 that "if the commission find the defendant
insane the court must suspend the trial," People v. Rhinelander held that,
despite a report of insanity by the majority of the commission, the court need
not follow the report and could send the defendant to trial. In the face of
this mandatory language of the statute it is surprising to find such an interpretation changing "must" to "may." It is equally confusing to discover in
People ex rel. Forresterv. The Sheriff146 the holding that the court cannot
find the defendant insane and commit him where the lunacy commission's
report is that the defendant is presently same or the report is unclear as to
sanity.147 The explanation of these two rules, in 1906, lies in the fact that
courts are reluctant to suspend trials since suspension usually results in the
loss of witnesses and the "c'ooling off" of the evidence. Thus, a finding of
insanity by the commission was not binding but a contrary finding was binding under-or in spite of-Sections 658 and 659 as they read in 1906.
The decisions in People v. Rhinelander and People ex rel. Forresterv. The
Sheriff, while not handed down by the Court of Appeals, are significant even
' 43 The Court of Appeals did not decide that the trial court could, without calling a
lunacy commission, find the defendant insane. See Note (1937) 37 COL. L. REv. 151.
144176 N. Y. 278, 68 N. E. 359 (1903).
' 45 Citing the McElvaine case.
146114
App. Div. 861, 100 N. Y. Supp. 193 (2d Dep't 1906).
147 See Note (1937) 37 CoL. L. REV. 151.
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under the present day statutes.148 At a later point their application to these
statutes will be discussed, but for the present it is apparent that if the decisions of the psychiatrists or doctors are to be binding in some cases, then their
examinations or hearings must be conducted on notice and hearing. 49 During the years from 1871 to 1906 (the date of the Forrestercase), there had
been no problem as to the type of examination the three disinterested experts
were to conduct. The informal examination and hearing had been regularly
conducted. 150 After that date the practice appears to have been to hold formal
hearings, on notice, with counsel for the defendant and the District Attorney
present.151 It is relevant to suggest here that the procedure of expert psychiatrists is stultified by the holding of formal hearings. 152 How can a spinal
test be made and cross-examined? How can syphilis of the brain be recognized by question, answer and cross-examination? Is it feasible to hold formal
hearings in a hospital or prison if the defendant is in such condition that it
is impracticable that he be moved?
Leaving these questions for a moment, we come to the remaining implication of the Forresterand Rhinelander cases. If the court is not bound by
a commission finding of insanity, then what evidence must the court receive
and what judicial hearing, if any, must the court grant before declaring the
defendant sane? People ex rel. Peabody v. Chanier'53 is directly in point
here. Under Section 454 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, where the jury
acquits a defendant because of insanity at the time of the act of crime, the
court may summarily commit him to a state hospital if it is of the opinion
that his release, while he is mentally disordered, would be dangerous to the
public. :5 In the Peabody case, the court had appointed a commission to
investigate the defendant's sanity. The commission's opinion being that he
was presently sane, the trial was continued, but resulted in a jury disagreement. A new trial was ordered and the defendant acquitted due to past
' 4 SSee Section 662: "If such psychiatrists find [the defendant sane] .. . , the proceedings against such defendant shall be resumed as if no examination had been ordered. If
the court does not concur with the findings of the psychiatrists, . . . the proceedings
against such defendant may be resumed. . . . " Also 'see Section 662 (a) dealing with
finding
of insanity.
149 See discussion of the administrative law involved, supra pp. 388 et seq.
15OE.g.,
People v. Tobin, 176.N. Y. 278, 68 N. E. 359 (1903).
' 5 ISee People v. Nyhan, 37 N. Y. Cr. 74, 171 N. Y. Supp. 466 (Gen. Sess N. Y. 1918).
Cf. People v. Taylor, 138 N. Y. 398, 34 N. E. 275 (1893). Especially note People v.
Irwin, 166 Misc. 751, 4 N. Y. S. (2d) 548 (Gen. Sess. N. Y. 1938), where the lunacy
commission under the 1936 act held twenty-two formal hearings before reporting to the
court that defendant was sane. The court then confirmed the report after giving defendant's
counsel and the district attorney the opportunity to be heard.
15 2 This subject is discussed infra pp. 419 et seq.
153133 App. Div. 159, 118 N. Y. Supp. 389 (2d Dep't 1909), aff'd, 196 N. Y. 525, 89 N.
E. 1110 (1910).
154N. Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 454 (1903).
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insanity. However, the court committed him to Matteawan Hospital as insane.
The defendant appealed from this decision contending that he had either a
right to a jury trial before commitment, or at least to notice and hearing
in open court. The appellate court split on this decision, three justices concurring in the majority opinion of affirmance, one justice concurring in result
alone, and one dissenting.
The majority held that the statute impliedly provided notice and hearing,
for two reasons: (1) Since the defendant had filed a special plea of insanity,
he was on notice that, if found by the jury to be insane in the past, the
insanity would be presumed to continue until the present, unless rebutted;
and (2) since the court could regard him and his actions during the trial,
that in itself was a proper hearing. The appellate court then went on to state
that the Legislature might constitutionally provide for the commitment of
defendants who were acquitted by reason of insanity, without any notice and
hearing, because the commitment settled nothing, not being a judicial determination, and could be attacked on writ of habeas corpus, which was the sole
judicial proceeding required to safeguard the defendant's rights. 55
The second written opinion proceeded on other grounds. First, it intimated
that even were the defendant constitutionally entitled to a jury trial, he had
waived it by his failure to demand such trial. Then the Justice compared the
proceedings under Section 454 with those under the Mental Hygiene Law
and found that the commitment by the court was merely provisional in both
instances and therefore constitutional, being non-determinative of the issue
of insanity.
The dissent took issue with both opinions, and found the statute unconstitutional. It conceded that the legislature could, as a proper exercise of the
police power, provide for a temporary commitment without notice and hearing. But the statute here definitely was not one providing for such commitment, and therefore, was unconstitutional unless it provided for notice and
hearing before commitment. There could be no legal support for the presumption indulged in by the majority of the court, based on the plea of
insanity. There was no adequate notice and, at all events, there was no hearing, for a hearing comprises the opportunity to defend, and the mere observance of defendant's demeanor by the court could not constitute a hearing.
Finally, the statement that the hearing on writ of habeas corpus was a sufficient judicial determination must be rejected, said the dissent, because that
writ is corrective, merely intended to review prior judicial determinations
and not to supply the judicial requisites which were lacking in the earlier
proceedings.
15sBut see the discussion supra p. 386.
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The most recent indication of an answer to these issues is found in People
56 The defendant had pleaded guilty to a charge
v. Frasquery.1
of petty
larceny and, after examination by two doctors under Section 836 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, was committed to the Napanoch Institution
for mentally defective delinquents. Upon examination there he was found
insane and remanded to the sheriff to be liela for further court action. The
court, as a precautionary measure, ordered the defendant committed to a
hospital. Upon examination he was found to be suffering from schizophrenia
and to require treatment for insanity. The case then, strange to relate, went
to trial and defendant's counsel waived a hearing in court on the issue of
present insanity. Judge Freschi, however, refused to allow this waiver and
ordered defendant committed for observation by a lunacy commission under
Sections 658 of the Code, for he had grave doubts whether a permanent
commitment could be made without a legal and judicial determination of the
157
fact of insanity.
The problem discussed thus far under the New York statutes and decisions
received but nebulous solutions until 1936, when a major amendment was
added to the Code in an effort to bring the best psychiatric knowledge to
the task of determining present insanity and to provide a definite procedure
of hearing and decision of this issue. The 1936 amendments, however, being
patterned after the earlier statutes,'15 8 did not dispel the confusion rampant
since 1871.
The first and major additions were the new Sections 658 to 66 2a, found
in that portion of the Code relating to "Proceedings by Indictment":
Section 658: "Under a special plea of insanity to an indictment, or
at any time before a final judgment, whenever it shall appear upon sufficient and satisfactory proof, 159 that there is reasonable ground for believing that a defendant is insane, . . . the court may upon motion of

either the people or the defendant, or on its own motion, appoint a
commission of not more than three . . .persons, at least one of whom
shall be an attorney . . . ,60 and . . .one . . . a qualified psychiatrist

....to conduct an examination and hearing relating to the sanity of
such defendant, and report to the court as provided by this section. The
court may in its discretion, as an aid in determining whether there is
reasonable ground for believing . . .defendant . . .insane, commit the
defendant . . . , for observation for a reasonable period, to be advised

as to the mental condition of the defendant, and the information thus
156146 Misc. 137, 261 N. Y. Supp. 412 (Gen. Sess. N. Y. 1933).
157Cf. Trust Co. v. Safe Deposit Co., 109 App. Div. 655, 96 N. Y. Supp. 585 (Ist
Dep't
1905); SMOOT, INSANITY (1934) c. 6, § 124.
158 Laws 1871, c. 666, § 1; Laws 1910, c. 557, § 2.
159
This phrase was derived from Laws 1910, c. 557.
' 60As that term is defined in the Mental Hygiene Law [Laws 1936, c. 459, § 27].
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obtained shall be available as evidence, in the event of the appointment
of a commission....
"The commission must summarily proceed to make their examination,
and conduct their hearing. Before commencing, they must take the
oath... [of] referees. A majority.., shall constitute a quorum. They
must be attended by the District Attorney... , and defendant . . .be
represented by counsel. The commission may receive evidence . . . ,
call and examine witnesses, . . . under oath, .. .and may conduct a
personal examination of the defendant, within the scope of the rules of
evidence.... When the examination is concluded, they must... report
the facts to the court with their opinion or opinions, as to the sanity
or mental condition of the defendant as defined by section eleven hundred twenty of the penal law, at the time of such examination and at
the time . . . of the crime.' .
Section 659: "If the commission find the defendant insane, and the
court confirms its report . . . trial ...must be suspended until he becomes sane; and the court, if it deem his discharge dangerous . . . .
must order that he be, in the meantime, committed ....
Section 661: "When [defendant] becomes sane, the superintendent
must give a written notice . .,.to a judge of the supreme court...
The judge ...must require the sheriff ... to bring the defendant from
the hospital and place him in proper custody until he be brought to trial,
judgment or execution ... '"
Section 662a: "The cost of any commission of lunacy, pursuant to
the provisions of this article, shall be a charge upon the county. ..."
A second major provision was that in-Section 870 in 1933,169 appearing
in that part of the Code dealing with "Special Proceedings":
"If any person not held for a felony is in confinement under a criminal charge... , or under any other than civil process, shall appear to be
insane or ... a mental defective, . . .the court ...may commit such
...person... [in cases within the city of New York] ...
to a hospital
under the jurisdiction of the Department of Hospitals . . . ; who shall
keep such person ... until the question of his sanity, or mental condition be determined, as provided in the Mental 'Hygiene Law . . . [and
defendant to be lawfully committed, or returned to the court]. In either
event the superintendent of the hospital shall .. .report to the court
stating the conclusion reached or disposition made; or
. . [In feldny cases] . . . , where it appears to the satisfaction of
a judge of a court of record . . .that [the defendant] is insane, [the
judge] may [investigate], . . . and may, if . . .there is reasonable
ground for believing ...defendant [insane], call two physicians,
'6 1 Under Laws 1910, c. 557, the earlier provision as to present insanity was repealed.
From 1910 to 1936 the commission was not authorized to inquire into present insanity by
statute, but it was held that the court had the inherent right to demand that they do so.
People
v. Whitman, 149 Misc. 159, 266 N. Y. Supp. 844 (Gen. Sess. N. Y. 1933).
16 2 Formerly Section 836, renumbered 870 by Laws 1936, c. 460.
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and if he deem it necessary, or if a demand is made by [the] defendant
or . . . district attorney, after a finding by said physicians . . . , shall
and if it be satisfactorily proved and it is certified by
call a jury ....
both . . . physicians, that the defendant is insane, . . . [the] judge shall

...commit him [until he is sane].... [When sane, the superintendent
shall so inform the court and the defendant is then to be tried] ...
Nothing in this section shall be deemed to contravene the provisions of
law relating to the appointment and procedure of a commission to inquire into the sanity of a defendant, as hereinbefore provided."
Section 658 effected an obvious invasion of Section 870, in that the latter
provided for reports by doctors at any time. Since the sections overlapped,
there was bound to be confusion in the application of the one or the other.
Basically, the new sections constituted an ap'parent effort to bring to the
investigation of insanity the experience and knowledge of trained psychiatrists, rather than the jufy,16 3 but there were many defects which soon became apparent.1 64 These defects will be discussed later in the light of the
1939 amendments, but for a proper background to consider these amendments, it is imperative that the practice under the 1936 statutes be outlined.
In practice, the courts in indictable cases began to use Section 658 and to
disregard Section 870. Since the commission's cost was chargeable to the
county, the patronage ran exorbitantly high.16 5 Further, the courts in the various counties of New York City adopted different modes of procedure under
the statutes. Thus, in one county, defendants were committed to the hospital
under Section 870 if they were too obviously ill to be humanely housed in
jail. At the same time, a commission under Section 658 would be appointed
to examine the defendant at the hospital, although the psychiatrists there were
working up a complete case. At other times, the report on the hospital
commitment was used not only as a preliminary report for the convenience
of a commission when later appointed, but would serve, after a commission
finding, as a check-up for a cautious court. The number of commissions
always exceeded the hospital commitments. 66 In another county in New
York City, the- report under the hospital method of Section 870 was used
frequently as a basis for commitment of mental defectives to Napanoch, but
commissions were appointed whenever the hospital reported insanity. This
additional procedure was required because Section 870 in, 1936 did not provide for a commitment based on hospital reports, but provided only for a
163 See Note (1937) 37 COL. L. Rav. 151, 153, note 22.
1641d. at 155, 156: 'Whatever substantive and procedural improvements have been
effected by the amendments, they complicate rather than simplify .. . [the] criminal insanity provisions. . . . A comprehensive revision of the entire statutory frame work is
required."
definitely
L. REv. 1260-1262.
165
66 See Note (1939) 39 CoL.
1 See supra note 25.
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commitment based on a finding of insanity by a commission under Section 658.
In still another county, the criminal court of record adhered to a policy of
refusal of appointment of any commissions at all. Cases were sent to the
hospital, but, since those reported insane were rejected by Matteawan for
the reason stated above, this court developed the procedure of service of
subpoenas upon the hospital psychiatrists and all witnesses so as to prepare
a record, at a formal hearing before the county judge, upon which the commitment of the insane defendant could issue. This last mentioned court persists in this practice even under the 1939 provisions, despite the absence of
the original reason for the development thereof, and gives as its new reason
for an old method the desire to accord a constitutional hearing in a criminal
case.
Further, while some courts appointed commissions but rarely, others
appointed them in a quite amazing number of cases. Moreover, of these
commissions many members were so unqualified that the courts which appointed them, in many instances, had to disregard their findings entirely and
rely on the hospital reports secured under Sections 658 and/or 870.
In an attempt to eliminate the duplications, over-formal procedure, exorbitant expense, and gross inefficiency of the lunacy commissions under Section
658, the Desmond Act was passed in 1939, repealing the old Sections 658
to 662a and 870 of the Code and providing in their stead for a single method
for the investigation of present insanity. 167 The old difficulty of application,
however, still holds sway, and many problems raised are, as will appear, still
68

unanswered.1

The statute intends to provide the courts with the machinery for deciding
a purely medical issue, namely, that of present insanity. The new Sections
658 and 870 embody the rule of People v. Tobin in that the setting in motion
of the examinations, etc., rests in the sound discretion of the court. It must
appear to the court that there is a reasonable ground for believing defendant
is insane; and even if there is such reasonable ground the court's action is
discretionary. The statute is silent as to how it shall be made t6 appear that
such reasonable ground exists. If there is a special plea of insanity to an
indictment under Section 658, there need be no such showing for the initiation of procedure thereunder. Where there is no such plea, however, the
issue of insanity may be raised in any practicable manner-by ex parte information to the court or by motion of either counsel. The burden of proof
of such reasonable ground is probably not upon the defendant since the court
'67The new sections are set forth supra notes 13 and 14.
16 8 See discussion in People v. Pershaec, 172 Misc. 324, 15 N. Y. S. (2d) 215 (Gen.
Sess. N. Y. 1939), noted (1940) 14 ST. JOHNs L. Rav. 439.
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may on its own motion avail itself of the machinery specified. 169 The failure
of the statute to state the mode of informing the court in the first instance
cannot be criticized sharply, for the period of time provided by the statute
within which to raise the point, i.e., "any time before final judgment," is
broad enough so that there are countless practical methods of procedure; and
that which would be practical before trial may not be so during or after
trial and before sentence. The loose and flexible manner of this initial determination is, therefore, to be welcomed by the court, defendant and District
°
Attorneyy o
Assuming in any given case that there is an appearance of insanity or
reasonable ground for belief thereof, the next question dealt with in the
new sections is this: Which court, or courts, may initiate proceedings thereunder? Under Section 658 it is clear that the court having jurisdiction of
the person of a defendant indicted for a felony or misdemeanor is the exclusive tribunal which can act. This provision yields no problem since it has
reference only to courts of record such as the county courts of New York
City. Section 870, however, has yielded some trouble in this respect. Under
this section any court having jurisdiction of a defendant charged with, but
not under indictment for, any offense, may stay proceedings entirely and
order an examination as specified in Sections 658 to 662d. Thus if a defendant is charged with felony, but not under indictment therefor, a court
not of record, such as Magistrate's Court, may-if the sections are read
literally-stay proceedings and commit the defendant for examination. The
practice in the Court of Special Sessions and Magistrate's Court, in the past,
has been to commit defendants charged with crimes less than felony under
the first paragraph of Section 870 of the present Code, and there is no doubt
but that such procedure is proper. In People v. Pershaec, however, it was
intimated by way of dictum that courts not of record have today no power
16 9The 1936 Act allowed the court to act if upon satisfactory proof there was a reasonthe proceedings.
able
1 0ground for believing defendant was unable to comprehend
7 1n People v. Pershaec, supra note 168, the court stated that judges could still send
defendants to hospitals for preliminary observation so that the judge would be able to
ascertain whether there were reasonable grounds for believing defendant insane. Under
the 1936 act the court was specifically granted this power but it was eliminated in 1939.
In the main case, Collins, J., states that this elimination is not effective to bar the court
from continuing the former practice. This interpretation is not too sound, for it will result
in duplications of procedure, since, if the preliminary report shows defendant insane, he
will then be sent back to the hospital again for examination under Section 659. While it
is true that the results of the first observation may be of value in this further procedure
under the statute, the sending back and forth of defendants wastes time and money, and
taxes the facilities of the Department of Hospitals. Moreover, the very nature of the defendant's acts and/or his physical appearance will ordinarily suffice to raise a reasonable
doubt as to his sanity. Thus, if the court feels it necessary to commit the defendant for
the preliminary observation, the proper procedure should be immediately to commit
under Section 659. The repeal of the former sections of the code has done away with
the necessity for any hospital procedure preliminary to a commission.
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so to proceed under Section 870. Judge Collins, in that case, felt that only
a court having jurisdiction of the criminal action could avail itself of Section
870 before indictment. It is Judge Collins' fear that if any court not of
record may stay proceedings, then that would result in those courts having
the power to stay the proceedings of a grand jury and its indictments. The
legislature, he feels, never intended such a result, since it would be to grant
jurisdiction over felonies to courts which cannot have that jurisdiction under
the New York Constitution. Let us examine the argument on its merits.
The statutory language of Section 658 differs from that of 870. The former refers to any court having jurisdiction of the person of a defendant
indicted, while the latter refers solely to any court having jurisdiction of a
defendant charged with crime. The omission of the word person in the latter
section may therefore be significant and sustain the view expressed in People
v. Pershaec. The effect of this omission, however, can only be interpreted
in the light of the practical problem presented. Assume a defendant is
arraigned bef6re a magistrate and is charged with felonious assault. The
magistrate, upon regarding the accused, before plea, believes the accused
may be insane. If this is the case, and if the magistrate has such power, he
may stay the proceedings against the accused and commence proceedings under
Section 658. But if the magistrate has not such power, then he will be
required to compel a plea from an insane person-a requirement which Section 1120 of the Penal Code seeks to obviate' 71-and the insane person will
be confined in a prison rather than in a hospital where he may be properly
treated. On the other band, if the magistrate does have the power to stay
proceedings and order the accused examined, may he stay the proceedings of
the grand jury or any other proceeding not before him ?172 It would appear
that the authority to enforce a stay only refers to proceedings in the court
which is committing the defendant; if so, the magistrate cannot interfere
with the grand jury or any other court. This interpretation, it is believed,
is in order and, if followed, will result in the immediate care and treatment
of persons who appear insane before magistrates. If the grand jury then
indicts, and a court of record secures jurisdiction of defendant, it may investigate further and determine whether the proceedings were appropriate.
To say that the grant of such power to magistrates is a grant of felony
jurisdiction goes too far, for the investigation of present insanity is merely
preliminary and a corollary to the criminal trial and criminal jurisdiction.
Once the proper court has determined to make use of the provisions of the
Code, the personnel of the body which will examine the defendant is selected,
17 1
See
72

1

mtpra notes 1-6.
See Letter of Senator Desmond, infra note 202.
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but not by the court. The examiners in New York City are two qualified
psychiatrists selected by the Director of Psychiatry of the Department of
Hospitals to make the examination, 173 aided by an assistant corporation counsel of the city.1 74 The present Act states that these psychiatrists are to make
an examination of the committed person and drops the phrase "examination
and hearing" of the former repealed sections. The examination is to take
place at the site where the defendant is detained or at a hospital. Under the
1936 act the examination and hearing was the last word in formality, the
numerous hearings being conducted like miniature trials. 75 A requirement
of formal hearings serves only to impede and obstruct the technique of the
psychiatrists, and it would have been desirable for the Legislature to have
provided specifically that formal hearings need not be held. There is no
statement in the statute as to the procedure which the psychiatrists mst
follow. The only provisions which might possibly afford a solution as to
their procedure are those compelling the psychiatrists to take the oath of
referees, granting them the assistance of counsel, and allowing them to
compel the attendance of witnesses and production of books, records and
documents. These statutory provisions, unfortunately, may be interpreted
by the courts as envisaging formal hearings by the examiners.1 76 However,
if the courts recognize the value of allowing psychiatrists to conduct their
examinations informally according to the exigencies of the particular case,
misinterpretation of the statute will be avoided and there will be a fulfillment
of the intent of the legislature to bring medical knowledge to bear on this
medical question.
To make the interpretation that formal hearings are not required the courts
must jump two constitutional hurdles. As the statutes read in 1936, in cases
before an indictment was returned the examination and commitment of the
defendant was made either pursuant to Sections 70 to 76 of the Mental
Hygiene Law or under the second paragraph of Section 870 of the Code.
In the procedure -under the Mental Hygiene Law the defendant was entitled
upon demand to a jury trial of the issue of insanity. Although this jury
trial was said in various dicta not to be of right or, at least, not to be a
regular constitutional jury trial, 77 a close reading of the law nevertheless
'7This provision succeeds in entirely eliminating the expense entailed in
tion of medical personnel.
' 74 The 1936 act provided for the appointment of an attorney. The value
depends entirely upon the type of hearing which the psychiatrists are to
informal, then the provision is not necessary.
175See, e.g., People v. Irwin, 166 Misc. 751, 4 N. Y. S. (2d) 548 (Gen.

1938).
76

court selecof legal aid
conduct. If
Sess. N .Y.

1 Note (1939) 39 COL. L. Rav. 1260, 1265.
' 77 See Sporza v. Bank, 192 N. Y. 8, 84 N. E. 406 (1908), where it was said, in a

dictum, that the jury trial accorded under the Mental Hygiene Law was not one of right.
Cf. People v. Haverstraw, 151 N. Y. 75, 45 N. E. 384 (1896).
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reveals that the trial was one of right. The procedure under the second
paragraph of Section 870, however, provided that the judge might call a
jury or, on demand, must call a jury, and if it were satisfactorily proved,
and certified by two doctors, that defendant was insane, the judge should
commit the defendant until sane. It is not clear whether, under this paragraph, the verdict of the jury was advisory to the court or determinative.Y' s
If it was determinative, then it was preserved by the adoption of Article 1,
Section 2 of the New York Constitution of 1938, and cannot be repealed by
the present Section 870. If it was non-determinative-as in all probability
will be held, due to the statutory wording and the intent of the legislature
not to provide for a mandatory jury trial-then the jury in this instance has
not been preserved by the 1938 Constitution. If this is so, then the first
paragraph of Section 870 in 1936, which also provided for jury trial, was
likewise effectively repealed in 1939, since the second paragraph was merely
an alternate to the first.
Assuming then that the jury trial above discussed was only effective to
yield an advisory opinion to the court, there now comes the second obstacle
to the court's allowing the examiners to conduct informal hearings today:
Does the statute make the report of the psychiatrists binding on the court?
If so, then the psychiatrists constitute a quasi-judicial tribunal and must hold
formal hearings on notice. This is the problem left by People v. Rhinelander
and People ex rel. Forresterv. Sheriff.
As far as a report of insanity is concerned, Section 662a specifies that the
findings of the psychiatrists that the defendant is insane will result in the
commitment of defendant only if the court concurs therein. If the court
does not concur with the findings, then, under Section 662, the trial will be
resumed. This provision appears to be a complete adoption of the rationale
of People v. Rhinelander. However, where the psychiatrists report sanity,
the case is not so clear. Section 662 reads:
"If such psychiatrists find .

.

. defendant is not in such state of . . .

insanity and the court concurs, the proceedings against such defendant
shall be resumed as if no examination had been ordered. If the court
does not concur with the findings of the psychiatrists ....

the proceed-

ings against such defendant may be resumed or the court may request
the . . . director . . . to appoint a third psychiatrist to examine the

defendant and submit a report to the court. .

....

This section appears to give the court the power to reject the finding of
insanity. However, even if the court does not concur, the court can only
resume the proceedings--i.e., the trial of the criminal charge--or appoint
l'iSNote (1937) 37 CoL. L. REv. 151, 152, note 12.
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another psychiatrist. If the psychiatrists divide, two for sanity and one for
insanity, can the court now reject the majority report? The statute stops
here and leaves the problem suspended in mid-air. Although the statutory
draftsmanship is subject to some criticism, an interpretation of the statute
can be made. Logically, there should be less leeway for the courts to reject
findings of sanity than of insanity, for if the defendant is sane he goes to
trial immediately and there will be no delay.1 79 However, since the statute
leaves findings of insanity to be rejected by the courts, it should also be
held that findings of sanity do not bind the courts. ,
There is a strong argument in favor of this interpretation. If the psychiatrists' decision binds the court in only one of the two cases, then, before
the decision of the psychiatrists is made, they will be forced to hold formal
hearings, for, in advance of the event, they do not know whether the prospective examinee is sane or insane. Under the above hypothesis--i.e., if
defendant is found insane, the court may disagree; but if sane the court
cannot-the psychiatrists would be judges and have to proceed as such. It
is therefore submitted that, despite the gap in the laws, the reports of the
psychiatrists are intended to be advisory only, and the psychiatrists may,
therefore, conduct informal hearings at any time.
As the procedure of the psychiatrists, then, results in merely an advisory
report, it is evident that the final determination of sanity or insanity is made
by the court. Thus the court must, under Section 662a, give the defense
and prosecution the opportunity to be heard before confirming a report of
insanity. Under Section 662, however, assuming a report of sanity by the
psychiatrists is not binding, there is no provision for affording counsel a
hearing in court before confirmation. This omission is traceable either to
poor drafting or else to a finding by the drafters that a defendant can be
compelled to stand trial, although insane, without a true judicial determination after hearings on notice. This writer's view, as already expressed, is
that the procedure should constitutionally afford defendant judicial notice
and hearing in both situations. This is not to say that the court must use
the machinery of Sections 658 or 870 on mere request, but that once the
request is granted there must be a judicial determination of sanity as well
as of insanity. As a matter of fact, however, despite the omission in the
statute, the practice has been to afford defendants their opportunity to be
heard. whether the report of the psychiatrists was insanity or sanity.180
' 79 Under Sectiori 662a the court must give the defendant's counsel and the district attorney the chance to be heard before concurring in a finding of insanity. Section 662,
dealing with sanity, does not so provide, although in practice such opportunity is there
also accorded. See People v. Irwin, 166 Misc. 492, 2 N. Y. S. (2d) 686 (Gen. Sees.

N. Y. 1938).

18OSee People v. Irwin, 166 Misc. 492, 2 N. Y. S. (2d) 686 (Gen. Sess. N. Y. 1938).
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Once there has been a hearing by the court and a decision, the defendant
must either be ordered to trial or be committed to a hospital for the insane
until he recovers sufficient mental order to undergo trial or sentence as
defined in Section 1120 of the Penal Code. Assuming there has been a decision, the logical question that arises is this: How can the defendant, if
committed, be released from the asylum, or be committed to the asylum and
trial stayed, after a decision of the court that was erroneous?
Taking first the decision by the court that defendant is sane, it is found
that there is no possible method of review of or appeal from the order
forcing the defendant to trial until the trial of the criminal charge has been
completed. The court's decision is an interlocutory one, subject to review
only after final judgment, and, therefore, the only proper procedure to follow is to move for a new trial of the criminal charge on the ground that the
court has abused its discretion in failing to make use of the provisions of
Sections 658 or 870, or has declared the defendant sane where reasonable
men, given the same set of facts, would have declared defendant insane. 81
If the motion is denied, an exception taken to such denial lays the ground
for a review of the insanity issue by the Appellate Division. It is to be noted,
however, that appellate tribunals generally hesitate to reverse lower courts
for abuse of discretion save in instances of most flagrant abuse. In criminal
cases there is usually no reversal, because the defendant, whether acquitted
or convicted by the jury on a criminal charge, can still be put in an asylum
for confinement and treatment. 8 2 Reversals for error in these preliminary
proceedings are very slow in 'forthcoming because of the expense attached
to the requirement of a second trial of the preliminary issue and, perhaps,
of the question of guilt. This latter defect might be cured by a statutory
allowance of an appeal from a decision on present insanity directly to the
Appellate Division before the trial of the criminal charge. Whether or not
such provision is necessary or wise, it is apparent that the Legislature, in
the present act, has paid little attention to a decision of sanity and its resultant effect upon the procedural rights of a defendant. This neglect should
83
be cured by a better drafted statute.'
On the other hand, what occurs where the defendant has been found by
the court to be insane and is committed? Must he remain in confinement to
await the pleasure of the court ?1M Initially, it is noticed that there can be
no appeal to a higher court because the criminal charge has not yet beenj
1
18 2 People

v. Bechtel, 297 Ill. 312, 130 N. E. 728 (1920).

18 N. Y. CODE CUMi. PRoc. § 454; N. Y. Coas. LAW §§ 438, 438a.
18 3 See Section 662, and proposed amendment Section 662a and Section 662b, infra

notes
196, 197.
' 8 4In early times in England, defendants were committed to "await the King's pleasure,
until it be known." See 1 BL. Comm. 201.

CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 26

tried, and there can therefore be no final judgment from which an appeal
may be taken. However, this does not leave the defendant in too great difficulty, because he can always sue out a writ of habeas corpus and test his
sanity before a justice of the Supreme Court whenever he believes he has
regained his sanity.'8 5 But suppose the defendant, after commitment, must
be sent back to the court by the Superintendent of Hospitals to stand trial,
as provided in the act? Section 662a provides:
"A defendant so committed shall remain in such institution until he
is no longer in such state of idiocy, imbecility or insanity as to be incapable of understanding the charge against him or of making his defense thereto. In that event the superintendent of the hospital . . .
shall inform the court and the district attorney,.18 or their successors,sT
of such fact so that the person so confined may be returned forthwith
to the authority by which he was originally held in confinement. The
court from which such defendant was committed shall cause the sheriff
without delay to bring the defendant from such institution and place
him in proper custody, whereupon the proceedings against such defendant shall be resumed and he shall be brought to trial or legally
discharged."
There is thus again a total absence of the requirement of a judicial hearing
before the defendant goes to trial, much the same as in the first instance
where the court decides-without a hearing-that the defendant is sane.
Again, the writer reiterates his belief that where a defendant claims he is
insane, he cannot constitutionally be put on trial until there has been a judicial determination, on notice and hearing, of his sanity; and the examination
and reports of psychiatrists, in the first instance, or of the Superintendent
of Hospitals, after commitment, do not constitute the necessary judicial
determination.
This detailed discussion of the present New York Code of Criminal Procedure has demonstrated that there are defects and inconsistencies pervading
the act. It is therefore appropriate to look at the amendments proposed to
cure these defects and to suggest further possible amendments.
Senator Desmond, the author of the 1939 amendments, with an aptitude
for perceiving the defects pointed out above, introduced on February 21,
1940 a series of proposed amendments to the Code of Criminal Procedure,
with the intent of remedying such defects and of clearing up the various
problems encountered by courts and psychiatrists. 8 8 The proposed act would
185N. Y. CIV. PRAC. AcT § 1269. Section 662a, N. Y. CODE CRIm. PROC.

186
1 5 Note

that there is no provision for informing the defendant or his counsel.
8 This indicates that the statute contemplates situations where the commitment will
remain
indefinite.
1 8 N. Y. Senate Introd. No. 1290, Print No. 1520, Feb. 21, 1940.
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amend Sections 658 to 662a in many respects. s9
The new Section 658 would apply in all cases where an information has
been filed, as well as where an indictment has been handed down. 190 The
purpose of this addition is to assure the Court of Special Sessions the power
to commit defendants charged with misdemeanors but not indicted therefor."'
This section also specifies that the question to be determined is not that of
defendant's insanity, but "whether he is incapable of understanding the
charge, indictment or proceedings or of making his defense because he is
in the aforesaid state." This new feature is to be welcomed because it follows the language of Section 1120 of the Penal Code and expressly indicates
the answer which the psychiatrists are to give after their examination. The
new section, however, preserves the language of the old as to the requirement
of "reasonable ground" for believing a defendant is insane before the court
shall act. This phrase could well be omitted, for, after all, the issue is a
medical question, and if there is any doubt-not a reasonable doubt or ground
therefor-that defendant is insane, then the procedure should be followed.
The basic purposes of the act were and are to provide a single procedure
and standard for the determination of this medical issue. Therefore, it would
seem to be unnecessary to commit for preliminary observation or to require
prolonged hearings before use of Section 658392 On any belief that the
defendant is insane the court should in its discretion avail itself of Section
658; and, if the court finds that the appearance of insanity is feigned or
simulated for dilatory purposes, it may in its just discretion refuse to use the
machinery of Section 658.
The proposed Section 659 remains the same as the present section, except
for the dropping of the provision which allows the assistant corporation
counsel to aid in the psychiatric examination. This omission is sound because
3891d., § 1: "Section 1. Sections six hundred and fifty eight,' six hundred and fiftynine, six hundred and sixty, six hundred and sixty-one, six hundred and sixty-two and six
hundred sixty-two-a of the code of criminal procedure are hereby amended to read as
follows: ... (Matter in brackets is old matter, to be omitted; matter in italics is new)."
'90 Section 658: "Court order for examination as to sanity of defendant. If at any time
before final judgment it shall appear to the court having jurisdiction of the person of a
defendant indicted for a felony or a misdemeanor or against whom an information has
been filed by the district attorney that there is reasonable ground for believing that such
defendant is in such state of idiocy, imbecility or insanity that he is incapable of understanding the charge, indictment or proceedings or of making his defense, or if the defendant makes a plea of insanity to the indictment or information, instead of proceeding
with the trial, the court, upon its own motion, or that of the district attorney or the defendant, may in its discretion order such defendant to be examined to determine [the question of this sanity] whether he is incapable of understanding the charge, indictment or
proceedings or of making his defense because he is in the aforesaid state."
' 9oSee People v. Pershaec, 172 Misc. 324, 15 N. Y. S. (2d) 215 (Gen. Sess. N. Y.
1939),
denying such power to the Court of Special Sessions.
' 9 2But see People v. Pershaec, 172 Misc. 324, 15 N. Y. S. (2d) 215 (Gen. Sess. N. Y.
1939).
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it recognizes, as do the proposed Sections 661, 662a and 662b, that the
examinations of a psychiatrist should be and are informal; and, therefore,
there is no need for formal procedure or legal advice thereon. That the
procedure of the doctors is truly informal is evidenced in the proposed Section 661, repealing the present Section 661 which permits the examining
psychiatrists to hold formal hearings.P 3 While this is as it should be, the
phraseology of the proposed section-but not its meaning and effect-is open
to the criticism that it might be better to allow the psychiatrists to "interrogate
any person as to any matter relevant to their examination," without specifying the matters concerning which they may require persons to testify.
The new Section 662, aside from requiring for administrative purposes.
that the psychiatrists report in quadruplicate,' 9- eliminates the provisions as
to the findings of the psychiatrists, 195 such provisions being consolidated into
the proposed Sections 66 2a,196 662b197 and 662c.' 98 The new Section 662a
193 Proposed Section 661 (This whole section is new.) : "Procedure. Such psychiatrists
shall not hold formal hearings nor take testimony. Where in order to reach a determination on the question referred to them they find it necessary to interrogate persons as to
the personal or family history or social background of the defendant they may in the
city of New York through the director of the division of psychiatry and outside the city
of New York through the superintendent of the hospital, as the case may be, request tlhe
court having jurisdiction of the defendant to issue and cause to be served subpoenas
commanding the persons named therein to appear before the said psychiatrists and answer
the questions put to them."
' 94 0ne copy for the district attorney, one for the defense counsel, one for the court,
and one for the superintendent of the hospital.
19 5Proposed Section 662: "Reports to court. Upon the completion of such examination of a defendant the superintendent of the hospital or Director of the Division of
Psychiatry of the Department of Hospitals of New York City, as the case may be, must
forthwith transmit to the court in [duplicate] quadruplicate a full and complete repqrt
including the findings of the qualified psychiatrists who have conducted the examination
to the effect that the defendant is, or is not, at the time of such examination in such
state of idiocy, imbecility or insanity as to be incapable of understanding the charge
against him or the proceedings or of making his defense. Such report shall include a
recommendation as to the appropriate instjitution to which such defendant should be
sent if committed. [If such psychiatrists find that the defendant is not in such state
of idiocy, imbecility or insanity and the court concurs, the proceedings against such
defendant shall be resumed as if no examination had been ordered.] If [the court does
not concur with the findings of the psychiatrists, or if] the two psychiatrists do not
agree in their findings, [the proceedings against such defendant may be resumed or]
the court may request the superintendent of the hospital or the director of said division
of psychiatry, as the case may be, to appoint a third psychiatrist to examine the defendant and submit a report to the court. The report of the psychiatrists made pursuant to this section shall not be received in evidence... 2'
19 6Proposed Section 662a: "Hearings before the court. . . . If either counsel . . .
does not accept the findings of the psychiatrists and wishes to contravert them, the court
shall accord counsel . . . full opportufiity to be heard . . . and to present witnesses and
evidence."
197Proposed Section 662b: "Procedure where defendant is not found insane. If, after
receiving the report . . . and giving counsel . . . full opportunity to be heard, the court
does not find . . . the defendant . . . incapable. . . . the proceedings . . . shall be
resumed as if no examination had baen ordered."
198 Proposed Section 662c: "Procedure where defendant is found insane. If after
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eliminates the distinction between a finding of insanity and sanity by the
psychiatrists. Under this section the defendant receives-as was suggested
herein-a notice and hearing no matter what the psychiatrists find, if he
disagrees with their findings. Although the court is left finally to decide
the issue of sanity, whether the report be sanb or insanity, and even though
the court may therefore disregard the findings of the medical experts, it is
apparent that, in view of the nature of the subject matter dealt with, the
court must necessarily be the final arbiter unless a quasi-judicial tribunal of
experts is to be set up-as in Louisiana and Connecticut-to decide this issue.
Aside from the hearing provisions of the proposed Section 662a, there are
the provisions of proposed Section 662c allowing the commitment of defendants to institutions for mental defectives under the supervision of the
Department of Mental Hygiene or Department of Correction. These provisions meet a crying need today, for under Section 438 of the Correction
Law, institutions for mental defectives, such as Napanoch Institution, are
required to admit only persons convicted of crime, and it has been customary
to refuse to admit patients who were sought to be admitted under the present
Sections 658 or 870. The proposed section does away with this conflict.
It is, nevertheless, this writer's belief that this purpose should be carried
out in the repeal clause of the proposed enactment9 9 by a statement that
the proposed sections, if enacted, should supersede all conflicting statutes of
New York State; or there should, alternatively, be a companion amendment
to Section 438 of the Correction Law stating, in terms, that all persons against
whom proceedings have been taken under the proposed sections shall be
eligible for admission to the Napanoch Institution. Either of these alternate
additions will prevent the overlapping of the Code of Criminal Procedure
and the Correction and other laws.
The final feature of the proposed Section 662a is that providing for the
return to court of persons committed while insane who have now become
sane. Under the present and proposed acts a defendant will be returned
when the superintendent of the hospital or institution certifies and reports
to the court that the defendant is no longer incapable of understanding the
proceedings against him. Thus, aside from release on habeas corpus, a degiving... counsel full opportunity to be heard ...
the court finds that the defendant
... is incapable . . .the trial must be suspended until he becomes sane and the court
shall commit the defendant to a state hospital . . . or to a school or institution for
mental defectives under the department 6f mental hygiene or the department of correction .... A defendant so committed shall, except as otherwise provided in Section six
hundred and sixty-two-d, . . . remain in such institution until he is no longer .
incapable
of understanding. ..."
199
Section 6: "The provisions of this code shall govern and . . .not be superseded
by any provision of the mental hygiene lav or other statute unless specifically so
provided. . . "
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fendant who is sane can only be released for trial by action of the superintendent. This appears to be wrong in principle, for if a defendant is to
be accorded a hearing under the proposed Section 662a in the first instance,
he should also receive a hearing before his return to the court by the superintendent of the hospital, the return being but part and parcel of the first
hearing. This writer would, therefore, add to the proposed Section 662a
the following:
"The court from which such defendant was committed shall cause
the sheriff without delay to bring the defendant from such institution
and place him in proper custody, whereupon the court shall hold a hearing, as provided in Section 662a, affording the defendant and district
attorney full authority and opportunity to be heard, upon request. If
the court finds defendant is capable, ...
he shall be brought to trial
or legally discharged; if the court finds him incapable . . . he shall be
returned to the institution from whence discharged by the superintendent."
This provision would take care of defendants who have become sane after
commitment. However, there are many defendants who will remain, in all
probability, insane for life. The purpose of the commitment under the Code
being to treat and cure criminally insane defendants, the question has many
times been asked whefher it is just to continue in confinement defendants
in that condition who are not a danger to society. The proposed Section 662
rectifies this possibility, providing for the release of mental defectives who
cannot be cured, but who may not be a menace to society if released. 20 0 The
justice of the principle enunciated in this section is apparent. Assume a defendant is charged with the commission of a misdemeanor and committed
under Section 658 before trial. The maximum sentence he could possibly
receive on the criminal charge, if found guilty, would be one year. Yet he
could, if the proposed Section were not enacted, be kept in a hospital for life,
even though not dangerous to society. However, though the principle of the
section is just, its application may be found difficult.
Initially, the decision to release these defendants lies in the discretion of
the superintendent of the hospital. If he should refuse to certify to a justice
of the Supreme Court that the defendant is one of those persons eligible for
200
Proposed Section 662d: "Release of certain defendants who are mental defectives.
Where a defendant charged with a crime or offense other than the one punishable by
death has been committed . . . and has been in such hospital or institution for a considerable time, if the superintendent . . . is of the opinion that the defendant is a mental
defective who will never be capable of understanding, . . . and that his release will not
be dangerous to the public peace or safety, such superintendent shall certify that fact

to the commissioner of mental hygiene and a justice of the Supreme Court . . . and
shall give notice to the district attorney. Whereupon such justice . . . shall inquire into
the ...

facts ...

and if satisfied ...

may authorize the release of such defendant ....

"
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release under the section, it is doubtful whether any proceeding could be
used to force him to act. Since the decision is to be finally made by the
Supreme Court justice, it is here submitted that the best procedure would
be to omit any reference to the superintendent of the hospital and to let the
issue be tried before such justice on writ of habeas corpus-that is, amend
Section 1329 of the Civil Practice Act relative to habeas corpus to permit
the release of defendants dealt within the proposed Section 662d, even though
20
mentally defective, on writ of habeas corpus.
Thus far the proposed sections deal with commitments by courts of record
-the county courts and the Court of General Sessions. The procedure outlined in the above proposed sections is applied to cases before the magistrates
and justices of Special Sessions, but due to the prevalent strong feeling that
courts not of record lack the power, under the constitution of New York
state, to commit criminally insane defendants, Senator Desmond has attempted
specifically to cover all types of cases arising in those courts, in proposed
Section 870-876.2o2 Thus, under Section 870, as proposed, the magistrate
is specifically given the power to require examination under Sections 658
to 662d ;203 and to insure the constitutionality of the commitment it is specifi2

01N. Y. JUD. LA.v § 31, still allows the court on habeas corpus to appoint three
medical experts to examine defendants, and testify as to their examinations. This
section should be repealed as it meets with the same objections voiced against the lunacy
commissions as they existed prior to 1939. In lieu of this section a new section should
be added allowing the court to avail itself of a procedure similar to that allowed under
the2 02present code in New York, Sections 658-662d.
See letter of Senator Desmond, printed in N. Y. L. J., Nov. 21, 1939, p. 1728,
Interpretation of Section 870 of the Code of Criminal Procedure:
".... I would state that it was the intention of the framers . . . , in enacting Section
the power . . . to order the defendant to be
870 . . . , to give to the Magistrates ....
examined to determine.. . . his sanity. . . . The procedure to be followed should be
exactly identical . . . with the method employed . . . in Sections 659-662c.....
"It was our intent that . . . the Magistrate should proceed as would a Judge of the
Court of General Sessions or of the County Courts ...
"Now with regard to another question . . . , namely, as to the power which section
870 is believed by some to confer upon Magistrates 'to stay all proceedings in the case.'
"That was not the intention of the framers of the Law; nor do we think that the
language . . . warrants such construction and we doubt very much that the appellate
courts . . . would so hold. All that was intended was to provide that the Magistrate
. . . might . . . stay the proceedings before him. . . . There was no thought, whatever,
of thus conferring upon Magistrates and Judges of courts not of record the power to
stay all further proceedings ...
"It would seem that the practical procedure to follow . . . [would be to have the
district attorney] proceed to take up the question of the defendant's indictment by the
Grand Jury ...
"As you will recognize, as soon as the indictment is secured, the Magistrate would
lose jurisdiction of the defendant and the Court of General Sessions in New York
County . . . would acquire jurisdiction over him.
"Undoubtedly, the Judge of General Sessions . . . . under such circumstances, would
instruct the Psychiatrists to complete their examination . . . , and render their report
to him,
instead of to the Magistrate. .. ."
20 3 Proposed Section 870: "Where a person is charged with either a felony or a
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cally provided that the magistrates can only stay those proceedings wlich
are ordinarily conducted by magistrates. 20 4 If the defendant is subsequently
indicted, it is clear that neither the court of record nor the grand jury can be
interfered with by the magistrate.2 0 5 If no indictment is returned, however',
there is still the objection in many quarters that to allow the magistrate to
commit is to allow him, unconstitutionally, to exercise jurisdiction over
felonies. This objection must be rejected since the issue determined is only
preliminary to the trial of the criminal charge. Even if it be conceded, however, that the magistrate has no power beyond the ordering of the examination, there can be still another method of committing the defendant. In the
proposed Section 872, the magistrate, after the receipt of the report and the
finding of insanity where the defendant is not indicted, must order the superintendent or director to apply to the Supreme Court for commitmenf. 20°
There can be no quarrel with the shifting of the determination of the issue
to the Supreme Court, but for the saving of time and money it might be
better to provide for the return of the report directly to a justice of the Supreme Court, thus leaving the magistrate only the power to initiate the examination but not to determine the issue and eliminating thereby an unnecessary
20 7
duplication.
Sections 874. through 876, as proposed, deal with defendants charged with
offenses less than crimes. Since these Sections are similar to those alreadr
discussed, they need not be re-examined here.
There is yet one final section that needs treatment, viz., Section 6, the
repeal clause of the proposed act. This repeal clause raises the questions
misdemeanor and an indictment or information has not been filed, if at the hearing
before the magistrate there is reasonable ground for the magistrate to believe that such
defendant . . . is incapable of understanding . . . the magistrate . .. may . . . stay the
proceedings before him and order such defendant to be examined. . . . The procedure
shall be as set forth in sections six hundred and fifty-nine to six hundred and sixty.. .."
tw o.
2 4

O Although here, again, the magistrate must have a reasonable ground before acting,
this provision is unnecessary to some extent. See the discussion of this phrase, supya
et seq.
pp.20409
5
Proposed Section 871: "If before the magistrate renders his findings upon the report of the psychiatrists . . . the defendant is indicted . . . . the report . . . shall be
presented to the court in which the indictment of information is triable. Such court
may take cognizance of the examination order by the magistrate and may receive the
report
of the psychiatrists as if originally ordered by such court. ..."
2
06Proposed Section 872: ". . . If the defendant is not indicted, . . . the report of
the psychiatrist shall be made to . . . magistrate. . . . If the magistrate finds . . .
defendant . . . incapable of understanding the charge . . .. the magistrate shall order
the superintendent .... or ... the director of the division of psychiatry, to take measures
for . . . commitment as provided in the Mental Hygiene Law for the commitment of a
person not in confinement on a criminal charge. . . . A justice of the Supreme Court
may commit the defendant to a state hospital . . . or to a school or institution for
mental
defectives."
20 7
It should be noted that the last two sentences of Section 872 meet with the same
objections as found in proposed Section 662c.
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commonly found in clauses of such nature: Shall they be general, and therefore in danger of erroneous court interpretation; or specific, and in danger
of omitting reference to conflicting statutes? If it is a practical impossibility
to force a specific repeal statute through the legislature, then Section 6 is good
as it stands. If feasible, however, it would be well to go through the provisions of the Correction, Mental Hygiene, and judiciary Laws, and the Code
of Criminal Procedure itself, and to draft amendments repealing the provisions of those statutes which, at least on their face, conflict with the
present and proposed sections.
It is evident from this discussion of the New York Code of Criminal Procedure, the amendments proposed thereto, and this writer's suggested revisions that the basic principle of these acts is that justice is best served in
these cases, both theoretically and practically, by requiring the psychiatrists
to render advisory reports after informal examinations and by leaving the
existing judicial tribunals finally to determine the defendant's capability of
facing trial. In recent years, however, there has been some agitation for a
radical change in the existing system by the establishment of expert, psychiatric, quasi-judicial commissions with power to foreclose the courts on
the fact of insanity. Among the leading advocates of this change from the
advisory to commission system is Dr. Israel Strauss, who is well known in
medical circles. After much study he has advanced a set of informal proposals to amend the existing Laws of New York respecting the determination
of present and past insanity and the legal force of such determination. His
proposals may be summarized, in part, as follows :208
There is to be set up a Board of Forensic Psychiatrists for the State of
New York, headed by a director appointed by the Governor with the advice
of the head of the Department of Mental Hygiene and subject to confirmation by the Senate, and composed of nine psychiatrists qualified under Section 27 of the Mental Hygiene Law, three psychologists and one experienced
lawyer. 2°9 This board is to have an office in New York City, but three members are to be stationed in Syracuse to render service in any area further
than 150 miles from New York City. The appropriation for this Board is
not to exceed $85,000 (exclusive of travelling and clerical expenses) for the
first year, but the amount is to be increased as the staff is enlarged to carry
the case load. It is the duty of the Board to determine the mental condition
and level of criminal defendants, and in every instance where it appears to'
any court of criminal jurisdiction that there is, upon satisfactory proof,
208

STRAUSS, SHOENFELD, AND GLASER, A MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATIONS By
CERTAIN MEMBERS ON TlTE COMMITTEE OF MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE NEW YoRx
ACADEMY
OF MEDIcINE (1936).
2

09AII Board members, save the director, are to be put under civil service.
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reasonable ground for believing a defendant insane, the court shall order him
to be examined by the Board. The examination must be conducted by at
least one psychologist member, and two psyciatrist members. In their examination they have the power to administer oaths, take testimony, compel the
attendance of and interrogation of witnesses, etc. They are then to report
to the Board as a whole, and the report is to be approved by the director
and lawyer member before transmission to the court. If the report be one
of sanity, the criminal trial must proceed. However, where the report states
that the defendant is mentally defective or insane, the diagnosis must be
sent to a.Board of Review (composed of the Commissioner of the Mental
Hygiene Department, the director of the Board of Forensic Psychiatry, and
a legal representative of the Attorney-General) for determination, and the
Review Board's decision thereupon is final.210
Although these proposals have not been drafted in legislative form and it
is therefore not clear to what extent both Boards will exercise quasi-judicial
powers, if at all, it appears that the attempt has been to create an expert
medical commission to determine the mental condition of defendants finally
so as to bind the courts on that issue. There is no point, however, in having
a hierarchy of Boards. In theory it may seem as though the establishment
of an expert administrative agency to handle this medical problem fits neatly
into the purposes and aims of recent legislation, i.e., to bring special knowledge to bear on the problem where it is needed and to foreclose the court or
jury whenever not possessed thereof. But theory and practice often diverge
to great extents. Thus, granted the theoretical basis therefor is correct, is the
commission system well-adapted to this field practically?
There is, first, the physical impossibility of handling the case load with
twelve members assigned to cover the whole state. This staff would hardly
suffice to cover the cases normally admitted to the Psychiatric Division of
Kings County and Bellevue Hospitals alone.211 Even if sufficient members
were added to overcome this physical obstacle, it is apparent that the cost of
the procedure would reach staggering proportions. That the legislature will
not permit high costs is evidenced by the attempt in the 1939 enactments
drastically to curtail the costs of examination procedure by making use of
21
OTestimony taken by the Board is not to be received in evidence at the trial (the
Board reports as to past as well as present insanity), but the members may be called
to testify by either party at no extra fee. Thus, if an insane defendant becomes sane
after commitment, and if returned to court, the Board must again examine him and
report to the court. All expenses of the system are to be pro-rated over the counties
in the ratio of the number of examinations conducted in that county. It is proposed
that the plan (which is to be supplemented by the adoption of ariother system similar
to the Briggs Law of Massachusetts) be tried out in New York City.
21iIn seven months after the passage of the 1939 acts in New York, there were 1100
cases of this type in Bellevue and Kings County Hospitals alone.
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available state and city functionaries. 212
Aside from these objections, there is one that goes to the heart of the proposed system: Where a defendant is actually insane, he cannot be kept safely
in prison but must be held in a hospital. The Strauss proposals recognize this
fact by providing that the Board may make preliminary commitments of this
nature. The psychiatrists in attendance at the hospital, however, must necessarily examine and treat the defendant so committed, regardless of the fact
that the Board must also do likewise. The Board, then, duplicates the practice
under the old lunacy commission system, and is itself not equipped to carry
out the excellent type of examinations conducted today because the .members
cannot physically examine defendants during observation over periods of time,
as is usually required. The superimposition of a Review Board to "doubly insure the people of the State of New York that such person cannot readily
understand the proceedings against him" is entirely superfluous, since it does
not envisage detailed examination of the defendant by the Review Board, and
therefore the Upper Board is even less well-equipped than the Forensic
Board. On the other hand, if such examination were envisaged, it would be
but a further duplication of the first Board's work.
Finally, if the Forensic or Review Boards' findings of fact are to bind
213
the court, their procedures must be based on formal notice and hearing.
This requirement is a boomerang and defeats the purpose of the proposed
system, since it is apparent that the procedures of examiners will be stultified
by formality. Even though this objection does not apply to the Forensic
Board where it reports insanity, it still holds as to the Review Board. In the
absence of evidence to indicate that there is an existing abuse by the courts
of their power to reject the present day advisory reports of psychiatrists, it
is submitted that there is no warrant for the substitution of a single or dual
board to be vested with that power wrenched from the courts. The Strauss
proposals, or any proposal, 21 4 for a change to the commission system as in
force in Louisiana, must be criticized as being impractical since the commission system (1) is overcostly, (2) superfluous, (3) involves duplication
of necessary procedures, (4) corrects an evil which is not existent, and (5)
does not fit into the normal pattern of administrative law since it is not
21 5
based upon the controlling principle of expediency.
212See

Note (1939) 39 Col. L. REv. 1260, 1261, 1262.
This is directly at odds with the 1939 proposals of Senator Desmond.

213

pp.21409 et seq.

See mpra

4See Senator McNaboe's proposal, S. B. No. 915 (1936), which died by executive
veto. This bill was basically of the same tenor as the Strauss proposals, envisaging
a 215
quasi-judicial commission system.
It is a settled principle of administrative law that the degree of expediency involved
should vary directly with the necessity for an administrative board. The degree of
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PRACTICE IN JURISDICTIONS OTHER THAN NEW YORK:
FEDERAL AND STATE SYSTEMS

There are statutes in 44 of the other states covering the determination of
insanity, and it is fitting, for such light as they may shed on the problems
confronted in New York, that they be analyzed and grouped. Four jurisdictions-the Federal Government, Delaware, Mississippi and Washingtonhave no express statutory provision concerning the matter in issue.
The Federal statutes contain no provision for suspension of proceedings
against a criminally insane defendant, and consequently have no provisions
along the lines of the New York Code of Criminal Procedure. The nearest
approach to applicable legislation is found in Section 211 of Title 24 of the
U. S. Code.2 16 But this provision has been interpreted to apply only in
criminal cases arising in the courts of the District of Columbia. 217 Thus the
federal courts, in the absence of statute, have been compelled to rely upon
2 s
common law. In Youtsey v. United States~
the Circuit Court of Appeals
stated that it was not in conformity with due process to try a man while .he
was insane, and though the trial of this issue lay in the discretion of the
lower federal court, it must be tried if the circumstances warranted it. Some
federal courts have seen fit to call in outside experts to examine the defendants and report to the court. 219 Others have taken counsel, defendant and
physicians into chambers for an examination of the defendant, and then left
the issue of present insanity to the jury, conducting the trial of this issue
expediency in this field is very minute and cannot be compared to that in Labor (NLRB),
Commerce (ICC) or Trade (FTC, FCC), etc.
21624 U. S. C. A. § 211 (1927): "If any person, charged with crime, be found, in

the court before which he is so charged, to be an insane person, such court shall certify
the same to the Secretary of the Interior, who may order such person to be confined
in 2 Saint
Elizabeths Hospital . . . [in Washington, D. C.]"
17
See 17 Op. ATT'y GEN. (1881) 211 (letter addressed to Hon. S. J. Kirk-wood,

Sec'y of the Interior. The Secretary had in custody a man who had not been convicted,
but declared insane before trial in a Federal District Court in Texas. Under a Statute
similar to 24 U. S. C. A. § 211 the Secretary desired to have the defendant committed
to Saint Elizabeths Hospital. Held, that the Statute was intended to apply solely to
residents of the District of Columbia, or men in the military service).'
21897 Fed. 937 (C. C. A. 6th 1899). The court held there was no right to jury
trial, and none was demanded; that although there was a jury trial in Frith's Case,-it
was discretionary, to be used only in cases of doubt; and that there was no statute nor
any provision of the United States Constitution which required a jury trial on this
preliminary issue. The method of trial was therefore in the discretion of the court
[People v. McElvaine, 125 N. Y. 596, 26 N. E. 929 (1891)] and it might be sufficient
that the court only inspect the defendant personally. . . . But here the lower court had
refused to act; it had not exerted its discretion one way or the other, nor stated on
the record the reasons for refusal of allowance of a continuance. For these reasons,
the judgment of the lower court was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings.
It should be noted that the' upper court seemed to believe that defendant could be
committed
to Saint Elizabeths Hospital. But see note 217 supra.
219
German v. U. S., 115 Fed. 987 (S. D. Ky. 1902).
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prior to, and in the same manner as, the trial of the criminal charge.220 The
most recent form of procedure used is exemplified in United States v. Hari,uzn,221 where defendant's mental condition was determined before trial. The
court stated :222

"The form of the procedure is in the discretion of the court...
In the law ... there are four available methods:
1) Committal
of the defendant to an institution for observation
224
and report.
2) Appointment of a commissioner to make inquiry and report.
3) Calling in the assistance of a jury,
4) Conduct of the inquiry by the judge alone.
"In this court committing to institutions for observation and report
has prevailed for a long time in such cases. There being no statute on
the subject, it has been usual, within my experience, to ask the defendant
or his counsel whether he consents to this method. I do not know that
consent is essential; but it has been prudent, or has heretofore been
regarded by the judges as prudent, to obtain it.
"Procedure through a commission exists in the courts of the state of
New York.... There is no like Federal Statute.... Even if, however,
there were an inquiry by a commission, its report would only be advisory.
There would still remain the responsibility for an examination by the
court itself,
"Neither side has requested submission of the question to a jury. The

defendant is not entitled to a jury trial ....
Lastly, after a jury verdict,
the responsibility would still remain on the court. . . . I have decided
that it is the duty of the court itself to conduct the inquiry .... ",225
While it is true that the procedure will vary from district to district, it is
evident that the court neglects the fact that commissions should be used, if
impartial and not costly, as in New York, since the difficult issue involved is
a medical one. The report of commissioners, though advisory, may and
usually does, result in so informing the court that justice is attained. However, the court is hampered by the lack of statutory provisions for the employment of psychiatrists and their payment. Some attempt has been made in"
recent years to provide the federal courts with the machinery for dealing

with criminally insane defendants. The Attorney-G.eneral, in 1930, was
authorized to select a site for the erection of a hospital where persons charged
2

20U.

S. v. Chisholm, 149 Fed. 284 (C. C. S. D. Ala. 1906).

F. Supp. 186 (S. D. N. Y. 1935).
221d. at 187, 188.
223
Citing Youtsey v. U. S., sfpra note 218, and U. S. v. Chisholm, 149 Fed. 284 (C. C.
S.2 D.
Ala. 1906).
24
2214
2

Where? To a local hospital not under federal jurisdiction? To Saint Elizabeths
despite
the ruling of the Attorney General?
2 25
The court then states that it will hold a hearing and allow defendant's counsel and
the prosecution to call witnesses, reserving to the court the power to call in additional

witnesses.
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with, as well as convicted of, federal crimes could be confined and treated. 226
However, even if such hospitals were erected (and it does not so appear)
there is still a total lack of legislation concerning examination of these de2 27
fendants, and it is for Congress to correct this situation.
V.

TREND OF RECENT LEGISLATION

Of the three remaining jurisdictions where this field has not been touched
by legislation, Delaware is the least progressive. The Legislature of that state
has enacted a series of excellently written and minutely careful provisions for
the examination, commitment and treatment of non-criminally insane defendants, 228 and 'persons convicted of crimes.229 However, in a situation where
suspension of trial, examination and treatment would best serve the state and
individual-that is, present insanity cases before or during criminal trials-the
legislature has left a gap, and the courts must flounder with common law procedures, decidedly outmoded today. Both Mississippi,230 and Washington, 23 1
have provisions for examination and commitment of criminal defendants
acquitted by reason of past insanity, but none concerning the issue of present
insanity, and, therefore, the latter lies in the discretion of the courts ;282
Florida, Oregon and Vermont have but recently departed from common law
practice and now have provisions which, to some extent, compare favorably
2 33
with those in the New York Code of Criminal Procedure.
Of the remaining states, about fourteen leave it in the discretion of the
court, under statutory provision, to try the issue by medical commission, jury,
or alone.23 4 The most typical of these jurisdictions is Ohio :235
22618 U. S. C. A. § 871 (Supp. 1940): "The Attorney General is . . . directed to
select a site, . . . for a hospital for the . . . treatment of all persons charged with or
convicted of offenses against the United States, . . . and who at the time . . . of their
detention . . . are or shall become insane . . . so to require special medical care." See
also 18 U. S. C. A. §§ 591, 695, 698 (1927); 18 U. S. C. A. §§ 751, 876, 907 (Supp.
1940).
2 27
England appears to be similarly backward. See 39 and 40 GEO. III, c. 94 providing for a jury trial of insanity past and present. See, generally, Rex v. Dyson, 7
C. 2 2& P. 303, 173 Eng. Rep. 135 (N. P. 1831).
8DEL. RaV. CODE (1935)
§ 3074, as amended Del. Laws 1939, c. 134.
2 29
1d., §§ 3082, 3083, 3084.
23
OMiss. CODE ANN. (1938) § 1324.
231
WAsH. REv. STAT. ANN. (Remington, 1935) § 6974.
2 32
Miss. CODE ANN. (1938) §§ 1324, 1325.
233
Fla. Sess. Laws 1939, c. 19554, §§ 203-205, Williams v. State, 45 Fla. 128, 34 So.
279 (1904) (discussing the common law); Om. CODE ANN. (Supp. 1935) §§ 13-922,
13-953; Vt. Pub. Acts 19.35, Nos. 51, 53. The Oregon Statute is fairly similar to the
New York Code of Criminal Pr-ocedure of 1936 and to the Proposed Chapter 17, Section
317 of the Final Draft of the American Law Institute Committee on Criminal Procedure
234 (1930).
E.g., Indiana [IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns, 1926) § 22951; Kansas (KAN. REV. STAT.
ANN. (1923) § 62-15311; Maryland [MD. ANN. CODE (Bagby, 1924) art. 59, § 81;
and Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Virginia, Wisconsin.
235
OHio GEN. CODE ANN. (Page, 1939) §§ 13441-1 to 13441-4.

1941]

INSANITY IN CRIMINAL CASES

"If the attorney for a person accused of crime ... whether before or
after trial suggests to the court that such person is not then sane ... or

if the grand jury represents to the court that any such person is not
then sane or if it otherwise comes to the notice of the court that the
person is not then sane, the court shall proceed to examine . . or...
may impanel a jury for such purpose....
•.. the court shall have the power to commit the defendant to a
local insane hospital ... for such time as the court may direct not exceeding one month; and the court may appoint [psychiatrists] to investigate236 [to be called by the court and be cross-examined.]237
Twenty states have statutes providing that the issue of present insanity
must be tried by a jury, whose verdict is determinative.2 38 The typical provisions are those in Montana :29
"When an action is called for trial, or at any time during the trial,....
if a doubt arises as to the sanity of the defendant, the court must order
the question as to his sanity to be submitted to a jury, which must be
drawn and selected as in other cases; ...and the trial jury may be dis240
charged or retained ...

during the pendency of the issue of insanity.

"[The verdict of the jury is determinative of the issue.]"
However, in these states the calling of the jury rests in the discretion of
the court, and a refusal to try the issue by jury will not be reversed unless
there was a palpable abuse of discretion, 241 and the appellate courts are
4
slow to reverse even in the most flagrant instances. Thus, in State v.Kelly 2
the defendant had gone to trial without a lawyer for two days before the
236
The decision of the court constitutes only an interlocutory judgment reviewable
only at the close of the criminal trial, or on hzabeasr corpus. See Wyman v. Turk, 62
Ohio
2 7 App. 227, 23 N. E. (2d) 644 (1939).
3 Cf. Pennsylvania [PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 19, §§ 1351, 1352; id., tit.
50,23§ 48] and Iowa [IowA CODE (1939) §§ 13905-13909].
SArizona [ARiz. REv. STAT. (1913) Pen. Code § 1265]; Arkansas [AiuK. DIG. STAT.
(Crawford & Moses, 1921) § 3055]; California [CAL. PEN. CODE (Deering, 1937)
§ 1368]; Georgia [GA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1926) Pen. Code §§ 976, 978]; Idaho;
Illinois; Iowa; Kentucky; Missouri; Montana; Nebraska; New Mexico; Oklahoma;
South Dakota; Tennessee; Texas; Utah; West Virginia; Wyoming; Alabama [ALA.
CODE
23 9 ANN. (Michie, 1928) § 4575] (felony cases only).

MoNT. REv. CODES ANN.

supplied.
0

(Anderson & McFarland, 1935) §§ 12213-12216. Italics

24 0f the 20 states providing for a mandatory jury trial 17 provide for the selection
of a special jury, but three (Iowa [IowA CODE (1939) §§ 13905-13907]; New Mexico
[N. M. STAT. (1915) § 4448]; Tennessee [TENN. CODE (Shan., 1917) § 2631]) provide
for the trial of this issue by the jury drawn to decide the criminal charge. The minority
jurisdictions' provisions should be changed to conform to the majority, since the decision of present insanity, although casting light on past insanity, is purely medical, and
may unfavorably move the jury on the issue of responsibility.
241
State v. Howard, 30 Mont. 518, 77 Pac. 50 (1916); State v. Peterson, 25 Mont.
81, 63 Pac. 799 (1912) ; State v. Harrison, 36 W. Va. 729, 15 S.E. 982 (1894) ; Contra:
People v. Geary, 298 Ill.
236, 131 N. E. 652 (1921). But cf. People v. Preston, 345
Ill.
11, 177 N. E. 76 (1931).
24274 Vt. 278, 52 AtI. 434, (1902).
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court appointed counsel for his defense. There was no claim of present insanity made, but the defendant talked and muttered incoherently to himself,
and had to be restrained at various times when he got into a frenzy. Yet, the
highest court of the state said :243
"[If] the judge had any reasonable doubt about it he should have it
determined by a preliminary trial of some sort.... [But] when the court,
in the exercise of a sound discretion, entertains no doubt of the prisoner's
sanity, no preliminary trial is required. . . .We cannot say from the
record before us that the court abused [its discretion]."
Not only is it evident that the jury did not qualify to pass on this medical
issue, but the jury cannot possibly qualify; and it is apparent that the issue
may be withdrawn from them by the court without the advice of competent,
unbiased experts. It is this writer's belief that the use of a jury, or of the
court's discretion, that prevails in these twenty states is backward in principle,
and in the light of modern psychiatric aids to the law. Such antiquated usage
frustrates the ,goal of the law which is to achieve justice. However, the so244
called Briggs Law in Massachusetts offers a hope for better legislation.
In that state, any person coming before any court in any case, civil or criminal,
may be sent by the presiding justice for examination by a member of the
medical staff of a state hospital.2 45 Under the Briggs Law, in a limited number of cases the defendant must be sent for such examination :2A
"Whenever a person is indicted by a grand jury for a capital offense,
or whenever a person, who is known to have been indicted for one or
more offenses or convicted of a felony, is indicted ...or bound over for
trial, the clerk of the court. .. shall give notice to the Department of
Mental Diseases, and the Department shall examine him as to his mental
condition and criminal responsibility, The Department shall file a report
with the clerk of the court.., and this report shall be accessible to the
court, district attorney and defendant .... ,,247
This provision for routine examination of defendants in certain cases has
been the subject of much comment,248 and must be commended because of its
basic recognition that insane people, whether or not they are criminals, constitute medical, rather than legal, problems to be dealt with by hospitals and
not courts.
The most recent and modern attempt to deal with persons who are mentally
24

3Id. at 282.
2 44
MAss. ANN. LAws (Lawyer's Co-op., 1938) c.
2 45
Main v. County, 223 Mass. 66, 111 N. E. 694
24
6MAss. ANN. LAWS (Lawyer's Co-op., 1938) c.
2 47

278, §§ 99, 100.

(1916).
278, § 100a. Italics supplied.
1n 1938 the name of the Department was changed to the Department of Mental
Health. Mass. Acts 1938, c. 486.
248
Overholser, The Briggs Law of Massachusetts (1935) 2 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoB.456.

1941)

INSANITY IN CRIMINAL CASES

disordered is that revealed in 1938 in Illinois. 2 49 Under a new statute, it is
provided that persons who are mentally disordered and charged with crime
may be committed to a hospital. The procedure consists of the filing of a
petition for commitment, in court, by the district attorney; an examination by
designated psychiatrists who report to the courts; and a jury trial, wherein
the jury must finally decide whether the defendant is criminally sexually
psychopathic.
It is unfortunate that the jury trial is retained, since this legislation evinces
a new trend, namely, to break up the types of mental disorders of criminal
defendants and to deal with each appropriately, taking into account the subject
matter involved. 250 Further comment on such legislation must await a few
years experience and practice.
VI.

CONCLUSIONS

Of the jurisdictions discussed, it is evident that New York State is among
the foremost (as is Massachusetts) in the treatment of the questions, both
legal and medical, involved in the medical determination of present insanity
in criminal cases. Whatever may be the defects in present practice in New
York, at least there is sufficient enlightenment to keep the issue from nonexpert juries and to require the opinions of expert psychiatrists who should
conduct their examination, as psychiatrists, in an informal manner. The fact
thus remains that the principle of the laws of New York, as we have conceived them in this discussion, is correct. Necessary changes will no doubt be
made to cope with the practical problems presented and the rapid strides of
the medical profession in the field of psychiatry and psychology.
24 0

ILL. ANN. STAT. (Jones, Supp. 1938) § 37.665.
ZOSee Note (1939) 39 CoL. L. REv. 534, commenting on this law.
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